What a Difference a State Makes: California’s Authority to Regulate Motor Vehicle Emissions Under the Clean Air Act and the Future of State Autonomy by Pappalardo, Chiara
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law 
Volume 10 Issue 1 
2020 
What a Difference a State Makes: California’s Authority to 
Regulate Motor Vehicle Emissions Under the Clean Air Act and the 
Future of State Autonomy 
Chiara Pappalardo 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, State and Local Government 
Law Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chiara Pappalardo, What a Difference a State Makes: California’s Authority to Regulate Motor Vehicle 
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act and the Future of State Autonomy, 10 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 169 
(2020). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol10/iss1/4 
https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.10.1.what 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative 
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
 169 
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A STATE MAKES: 
CALIFORNIA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE 
MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS UNDER THE 





Air pollutants from motor vehicles constitute one of the leading sources of local and 
global air degradation with serious consequences for human health and the overall stability of 
Earth’s climate. Under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), for over fifty years, the state of California 
has served as a national “laboratory” for the testing of technological solutions and regulatory 
approaches to improve air quality. On September 19, 2019, the Trump Administration 
revoked California’s authority to set more stringent pollution emission standards. The 
revocation of California’s authority frustrates ambitious initiatives undertaken in California 
and in other states to reduce local air pollution and mitigate the effects of climate change from 
mobile sources. This Article argues that the reasons offered by the Administration to justify its 
rollback of California’s authority are not persuasive. They do not find support in the history 
and longstanding interpretation of the CAA, in the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
implementation practice, or in the regulated industry, and, coupled with halting the rise in 
federal fuel economy standards, constitute unsound policy at a crucial moment for greenhouse 
gas emissions mitigation. In addition, this Article advances the idea that instead of aiming to 
suppress California’s experimentation with zero emissions vehicles, current and future 
Administrations should embrace new ways to cooperate with California and a growing 
number of states that have begun thinking creatively about reforming the transportation 
sector. By building on a flexible and multilevel model of governance, grounded on forms of 
cooperative federalism that leverage state innovation and regulatory expertise, the federal 
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I. BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH ELECTRIC VEHICLES   
In 1905, in a rapidly modernizing and prosperous America, everyone 
wanted an electric car.1 A status symbol of the upper class during the early years of 
the Automotive Age, electric cars were particularly popular in cities, especially 
among women who disliked the smell, noise, and vibration of their steam and 
gasoline-powered competitors.2 Electric cars were easier to start and drive and, with 
the concurrent expansion of urban electrification, charging stations quickly emerged 
 
1.  Megan Barber, Before Tesla: Why Everyone Wanted an Electric Car in 1905, CURBED (Sept. 22, 
2017, 3:36 PM), https://www.curbed.com/2017/9/22/16346892/electric-car-history-fritchle 
[https://perma.cc/DGY6-3T5D].  
2. Id. The turn of the twentieth century marked the passage from the horse, as primary mode of 
transportation, to the newly invented motor vehicle available in steam, electric, and gasoline versions. 
Steam vehicles required long startup times, sometimes reaching up to forty-five minutes in the cold, and 
were refilled with water limiting their range. Gasoline cars also presented challenges as they had to be 
started and operated manually, making them a less attractive option than their electric alternative. The 
History of the Electric Car, DEP’T OF ENERGY, (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.energy.gov/articles/history-
electric-car [https://perma.cc/Z3G2-XSJR].  




in homes and car-repair shops.3 Debuting in the 1890s, by 1900, electric cars 
accounted for about one third of all vehicles on the roads in the country, but by 1935 
they were gone.4   
Like many new inventions, the rise and fall of the early twentieth century 
electric vehicle was due to a combination of multiple but changing factors. Initially, 
electric cars did not have any of the problematic issues associated with steam or 
gasoline cars, and they could travel the same number of miles without charging, a 
perfect solution for short rides.5 By the same token, however, their subsequent fall 
from favor was the result of a series of technological advancements and political 
developments that turned gasoline-powered cars into the preferred individual 
transportation solution for Americans. Henry Ford’s mass-production of the Model 
T in 1908 made gasoline cars widely available and affordable to the average consumer 
and, by 1912, the electric starter had replaced the hand crank to start internal 
combustion engines.6 Road building and abundant, cheap Texas crude oil outpaced 
rural electrification in the early 1920s, eliminating the advantages of the electric 
vehicle.7 With gasoline refill stations suddenly readily available and charging stations 
absent, rural voters lobbied for paved roads with the slogan: "Get the farmers out of 
the mud!" and the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 created the Federal-Aid Highway 
Program that funded state highway agencies to improve the roads.8 A once top-dollar, 
luxurious, sought-after commodity, the electric vehicle gave way to the convenience 
of long distance travel and a desire for adventure and exploration among Americans 
that the gasoline-powered car could provide for a fraction of the price.9  
 
3. Barber, supra note 1.  
4. Id. To the delight of many contemporary urban mobility administrators concerned with air 
pollution and carbon dioxide emissions in particular, New York City had a fleet of more than sixty electric 
taxis. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2. 
5. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2. The poor road conditions outside cities meant that few cars 
of any type could venture farther. Id. 
6. Id. This was a revolutionary change given that early hand-cranks were difficult to turn and 
could result in serious injury, in some cases even death. Matt Wolfe, Yanking the Crank, AUTOMOTIVE 
HALL OF FAME (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.automotivehalloffame.org/yanking-the-crank/ 
[https://perma.cc/R5GQ-QZXT].  
7. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2; see also Mary Bellis, History of Roads in America and First 
Federal Highway, THOUGHTCO. (July 3, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of-american-roads-
4077442 [https://perma.cc/35T3-92ZX]. 
8. Bellis, supra note 7. Very few Americans outside cities had electricity at that time. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, supra note 2. 
9. Barber, supra note 1. “By 1912, the gasoline car cost only $650, while an electric roadster sold 
for $1,750.” DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2. 
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But 1935 didn't mark the end of the electric car saga.10 Starting in the late 
1960s and throughout the 1970s, periodic concerns about pollution associated with 
exhaust emissions from internal combustion engines and dependency on foreign 
imported oil kept the idea of—and experimentation with—electric cars alive.11 In 
1966, Congress introduced the earliest bills recommending the use of electric vehicles 
as a means of reducing air pollution.12 It also established the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) in part to study how interstate highways affected the 
environment, city development, and the ability to provide public mass transit.13 
Consumers and car producers, progressively more tuned in to the health and 
environmental consequences of traffic congestion—in part thanks to a nascent 
environmental movement—showed a renewed interest in electric vehicles.14 Unable 
to meet ever-rising demand for oil with internal production, the United States had 
become subject to the vagaries of the international oil market and the whims of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) members, which began 
dictating prices to the rest of the world.15 As a result, the term “energy independence” 
made its debut in Washington’s policy circles and debates, and in 1976, Congress 
passed the Electric Vehicle and Hybrid Research, Development, and Demonstration 
Act, intended to spur the development of new technologies, including improved 
batteries, motors, and other hybrid electric components.16 Despite these and other 
similar efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s by the government and car manufacturers, 
electric vehicles never gained sufficient traction,17 and the country’s massive 
transportation sector remained dependent on fossil fuels.18 
 
10. Timeline: History of Electric Cars, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/223/electric-car-
timeline.html (on file with author); History of Electric Cars, IDAHO NAT’L LAB., https://avt.inl.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/fsev/HistoryOfElectricCars.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5KJ-7HUE].  
11. IDAHO NAT’L LAB., supra note 10, at 2. 
12. PBS, supra note 10.  
13. Bellis, supra note 7. 
14. PBS, supra note 10.  
15. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2. 
16. PBS, supra note 10.  
17. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2. Electric vehicles during this time had limited performance—
usually topping at speeds of 45 miles per hour—and their typical range was limited to 40 miles before 
needing to be recharged. Significant technological improvements only began in the 1990s. When General 
Motors came out with its EV1 model, for example, it had a range of 80 miles and the ability to accelerate 
from 0 to 50 miles per hour in just seven seconds. Production costs were high, however, so it never became 
commercially viable. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2. 
18. After World War II, with the rise of the personal automobile and government subsidies for 
highways, many cities removed trolley tracks and expanded roads to accommodate cars and parking lots. 
The urban sprawl that followed locked in the country’s transportation patterns and consumed valuable 
farmland. Robert Polack et al., An Analysis of Fossil-Fuel Dependence in the United States with Implications for 
Community Social Work, 11 CRITICAL SOC. WORK 140, 141 (2010). This type of land use not only rendered 





Today, the automotive sector is a global industry undergoing major 
transformations.19 Some manufacturers, with Tesla at the helm, are betting on an 
electric vehicle renaissance.20 Other companies are researching and investing in the 
feasibility of hydrogen batteries and fuel cell technology.21 Well-established firms 
have begun selling hybrids, which are conquering noticeable market shares in Europe, 
United States, and Asia.22 With artificial intelligence technology rapidly improving, 
the automobile industry is moving towards the concept of self-driving zero emissions 
vehicle as the car of the future.23 Under this vision, electric vehicles and their 
batteries are designed to support the greater expansion of wind, solar, and other 
intermittent renewable sources of energy.24 This work in tandem between electric 
vehicles and the electric grid—increasingly powered by non-fossil fuels—could 
gradually move countries towards a low-carbon future.25  
 
Americans particularly dependent on automobiles and oil, but it also made extensive mass transit systems 
in metropolitan regions logistically difficult and costly. Jonathan English, Why Public Transportation Works 
Better Outside the U.S., BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/article
s/2018-10-10/why-public-transportation-works-better-outside-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/WSH4-4KGG]. 
As a result, the U.S. is the only industrialized economy today not investing in high-speed trains, which 
can reduce travel times by half and cut carbon emissions, and lacking access to rapid intercity rail in most 
of its cities. Natasha Frost, A Decade Ago, the US was Promised High-Speed Rail—So Where Is It?, QUARTZ 
(Dec. 27, 2019), https://qz.com/1761495/this-is-why-the-us-still-doesnt-have-high-speed-trains/ 
[https://perma.cc/WQZ2-XUJQ]; LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 513–514 
(2d ed. 2018).  
19. Patrick Koller, Transformation in the Automotive Industry, LONDON BUS. SCH. (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.london.edu/think/transformation-in-the-automotive-industry [https://perma.cc/2RHG-
K8N3]. 
20. See Shannon Baker-Branstetter et al., Electric Vehicle Sales Hit New Peak in 2018, CONSUMER 
REPS. (Jan. 15, 2019), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/electric-vehicle-sales-hit-new-peak-
in-2018-but-a-lot-of-room-for-continued-growth/ [https://perma.cc/8QLM-B5YG]. 
21. Joe D’Allegro, Elon Musk Says the Tech is ‘Mind-Bogglingly Stupid,’ but Hydrogen Cars May Yet 
Threaten Tesla, CNBC (Feb. 24, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/musk-calls-
hydrogen-fuel-cells-stupid-but-tech-may-threaten-tesla.html [https://perma.cc/YLC5-JX78]; Nathanial 
Gronewold, Australia Muscles into the Global Hydrogen Market, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/12/02/stories/1061700315 [https://perma.cc/7KE5-F88Y]. 
22. Global Hybrid Vehicle Industry, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2019, 8:45 AM), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-hybrid-vehicle-industry-300936314.html 
[https://perma.cc/6J2J-Z4UG]. 
23. John Fialka, How Sunshine and Robots Can Move People Out of Gas Cars, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/12/20/stories/1061855365 [https://perma.cc/M4Q9-
A3RA].  
24. See Electric Vehicles, INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (“IRENA”), https://www.irena. 
org/transport/Electric-Vehicles [https://perma.cc/85SX-FVN5].  
25. IRENA, INNOVATION OUTLOOK: SMART CHARGING FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES 1 
(2019). 
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Yet conventional cars continue to represent the vast majority of motor 
vehicles on the road and in showrooms in the United States and elsewhere.26 Neither 
automakers nor most consumers are ready to let go of mature and well-proved 
conventional technology.27 The fracking boom that began in the United States in 
2009—allowing the country to be a net exporter for the first time since the late 
1950s28—has contributed to this state of affairs, as have the powerful interests of the 
oil industry. 29 Nevertheless, deteriorating air quality continues to be a health issue 
in congested urban areas around the world.30 This is even truer in emerging 
economies such as China and India, like in large parts of the developing world, where 
sales of conventional cars are booming but environmental regulations are lax and 
little enforced if existent at all.31 With carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from 
transportation growing faster than power generation and agriculture as the leading 
source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions32, countries are 
beginning to confront the downside of conventional twentieth century transportation 
models, technology, and regulation, in favor of more innovative and differently 
incentivized innovations across the board. 
In the United States, problems associated with air pollution from both 
stationary and mobile sources have prompted extensive government intervention 
 
26. Maxine Joselow, 74% of Auto Dealers Aren’t Selling EVs, GREENWIRE (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1061539899 [https://perma.cc/NVQ9-XGUP]. 
27. Derek Pankratz et al., Framing the Future of Mobility, 20 DELOITTE REV. 94, 104 (2017). 
28. U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (“EIA”), 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/imports-and-exports.php [https://perma.cc/26UE-
S6EG].  
29. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, The Oil’s Industry Covert Campaign to Rewrite American Car Emissions 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/climate/cafe-emissions-
rollback-oil-industry.html [https://perma.cc/NE66-5RD9].   
30. Air Pollution, WHO, https://www.who.int/health-topics/air-pollution#tab=tab_1 
[https://perma.cc/Z3S8-VFEF]. 
31. Id.; see also WHO Global Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database (Update 2016), WHO, 
https://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities/en/ [https://perma.cc/9UFK-RBES]; 
India’s Emission Regulations Stands Exposed: CSE, ECON. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015, 11:03 PM), 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/indias-emission-regulations-stands-
exposed-cse/articleshow/49807982.cms [https://perma.cc/R57J-JCB6]; China Pollution: Survey Finds 70% 
of Firms Break Regulations, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
40239693 [https://perma.cc/4QTM-EVZB]. 
32. Shiying Wang & Mengpin Ge, Everything You Need to Know About the Fastest Growing Source 
of Global Emissions: Transport, WORLD RES. INST. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.wri.org/blog/ 
2019/10/everything-you-need-know-about-fastest-growing-source-global-emissions-transport 
[https://perma.cc/ALA2-5UGN]; U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FAST FACTS: U.S. TRANSPORTATION 
SECTOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 1990–2017 1 (2019), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF. 
cgi?Dockey=P100WUHR.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP48-KRFU]. 




over the past fifty years.33 In general, federal air quality standards are conceived of 
as “a floor” to prevent states from engaging in a “race to the bottom” and harming 
each other with trans-boundary air pollution.34 This is particularly true for stationary 
sources, and states are free under the law to set more aggressive regulations if they 
so choose.35 For mobile sources, however, particularly for cars, trucks, and buses, 
states are prevented from setting their own standards, with California being the only 
exception.36 Complicating matters, other states have been granted the right to follow 
either the California or the federal standard, thus creating two available sets of 
standards for the regulation of motor vehicle emissions.37 Recently, the Trump 
Administration has questioned this California-led, double standard approach. The 
Administration argues that it would be in the country’s best interest to have one 
national standard and has ordered the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to 
revoke California’s authority to set its own rules.38 In addition, the Administration 
has made clear that under the Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”), only the 
federal government may set fuel economy standards, and state and local governments 
may not establish their own separate fuel economy standards.39 In the words of 
Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao:  
 
Today’s actions meet President Trump’s commitment to establish 
uniform fuel economy standards for vehicles across the United 
States, ensuring that no State has the authority to opt out of the 
Nation’s rules, and no State has the right to impose its policies on 
the rest of the country.”40  
 
33. See generally Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. Congress was motivated to 
enact the CAA in part because of “the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about 
by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in 
mounting dangers to the public health and welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2). “The term ‘stationary source’ 
means generally any source of an air pollutant except those emissions resulting directly from an internal 
combustion engine for transportation purposes or from a nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle as defined in 
section 7550 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(z).  
34. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a Race and Is It to the Bottom?, 
48 HASTINGS L. J. 271, 274 (1997); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.  
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(a)–(b), (e)(2). Aircraft emissions also are preempted under 42 U.S.C. § 
7573.  
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507.  
38. News Release, EPA, Trump Administration Announces One National Program Rule on 




40. Id.  
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In America, states’ rights and national policy consistency rarely co-exist. 
This is particularly the case in the energy sector, where marked differences in natural 
resources availability, local economies, population size, cultural mindset, 
geographical extension, climatic conditions, and infrastructure translate into varying 
state and regional energy policy choices.41 Considerations involving interstate 
externalities, economies of scale and information, race-to-the-bottom behavior, 
centralized versus decentralized decision-making, and public choice rationales have 
long animated the academic and policy debate on environmental federalism with 
advocates on both sides.42 With the issue of climate change gaining more prominence 
and urgency, these considerations have now extended to comprise matters of energy 
law and policy, commonly referred to as “climate policy” or “climate federalism” 
problems.43 Not surprisingly, the question of the revocation of the California CAA 
preemption waiver has become part of the debate over federal regulation.44 From a 
normative standpoint, California’s authority to set more stringent motor vehicle 
emissions standards than other states creates tensions between the need, on one hand, 
to guarantee a sufficient degree of regulatory uniformity, predictability, equitable 
distribution of costs, and efficiency, and on the other, to leverage and further 
incentivize the sort of market innovations and competition that are occurring at the 
local, state, and regional levels.45  
This Article argues that EPA’s rationale for revoking California’s 
prerogative to set different motor vehicle emissions standards than those of the 
federal government is not persuasive and should not survive judicial review.46 
Coupled with halting the rise in fuel economy standards set by the Obama 
Administration,47  the rollback constitutes an unsound policy decision at a crucial 
 
41. See generally Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. Col. 
L. Rev. 355, 361 (1990); Davies et al., supra note 18, at 966–967; CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., 
CLEAN ENERGY STANDARDS: STATE & FEDERAL POLICY OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 1, 9 
(2019), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2019/11/clean-energy-standards-state-and-federal-
policy-options-and-considerations.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TAF-A5YG]. 
42. ROBERT GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW AND POLICY 85–91 
(8th ed. 2019); Engel, supra note 34, at 274–88.     
43. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1091–1093; Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The 
Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 446–47 (2008). 
44. See, e.g., Amelia Raether, Note, Commandeering, Preemption, and Vehicle Emissions Regulation 
Post-Murphy v. NCAA, 114 NW. L. REV. 1015, 1015–20 (2020) (discussing the recent Supreme Court’s 
expansion of the anti-commandeering doctrine and its limited impact in complex cooperative federalism 
regimes like the CAA).  
45. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1089–1090; Raether, supra note 44, at 1039, 1057.  
46. See infra Part II.C.  
47. Under these standards, the fuel efficiency of passenger cars and light trucks would have risen 
to nearly fifty miles per gallon by the year 2025. See infra Part II.C. 




moment for greenhouse gas emissions mitigation.48 Scholars have argued that EPA 
lacks authority to revoke California’s Preemption Waiver under Section 209 of the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”).49 In their view, such authority finds no support in the 
statutory language nor can be propped up by stray reference in the legislative history 
of Section 209.50 Moreover, reliance interests and federalism principles weigh heavily 
against it.51 Without revisiting the question of whether the Trump Administration’s 
unprecedented actions are legal, this author seeks to highlight at least three important 
reasons why the Trump Administration’s reasoning is fundamentally flawed and 
why, as a matter of energy policy, state autonomy should be preserved instead. Part 
II offers an overview of the jurisprudential and administrative interpretation of the 
federal statutory framework concerned with air emissions from transportation. Part 
III grounds California’s authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions in the 
legislative history of the CAA and offers a critique of the Trump Administration’s 
rationale for revoking it. Part IV takes a broader look at governance models for 
regulating emissions from transportation and highlights the advantages of letting 
states experiment with energy policies. Part V concludes that it is necessary to 
preserve state autonomy.  
II. REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
A. Early Statutory Steps  
Federal regulation of motor vehicle emissions began in the mid-1960s, after 
a decade of relatively ineffectual efforts on the part of states and municipalities to 
combat air pollution.52 In 1955, a modest program of research and technical assistance 
created by Congress to study the causes and effects of air pollution linked smog in 
Los Angeles to automobile emissions.53 As a result of these findings, motor vehicles 
 
48. See generally U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE 
ASSESSMENT (2018).  
49. See, e.g., DENISE A. GRAB ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, NO TURNING BACK 
(2018).  
50. Id. at 5–9. 
51. Id. at 9–12; Raether, supra note 44, at 1053–1056. 
52. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 400–401; Arnold W. Jr. Reitze, A Century of Air 
Pollution Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENV’T L. 1549, 1575–81 (1991).  
53. Congress passed the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, to 
better understand the causes and effects of air pollution, which had not been established. GLICKSMAN 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 401. 
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became the focus of air pollution legislation.54 Congress began testing new regulatory 
approaches and techniques that would later form the backbone of the modern CAA, 
the major piece of federal legislation addressing air pollution from both stationary 
and mobile sources.55  
Congress turned its attention to motor vehicle energy use in the mid-1970s 
in the wake of the first oil embargo. The 1973–74 embargo imposed by Arab members 
of OPEC and the subsequent tripling in the price of crude oil brought the fuel 
economy of automobiles into sharp focus.56 In an effort to reduce dependence on 
imported oil, Congress passed the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(“EPCA”) and established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards 
for passenger cars beginning in model year 1978 and for light trucks in model year 
1979.57 The standards required each auto manufacturer to meet a target for the sales-
weighted fuel economy for its entire fleet of vehicles sold in the United States in 
each model year.58 They rose steadily through the late 1970s and early 1980s.59  
The end of a second oil embargo in the mid-1980s saw a return to relative 
stability in the oil markets, and Congress did not revise the legislated CAFE 
standards for passenger cars, which remained at 27.5 mpg, until 2011.60 The light 
truck standards were increased to 20.7 mpg in 1996, where they remained until 2005, 
when the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) within the 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) promulgated two sets of standards for 
model years 2005–2007 and 2008–2011, increasing light truck standards to 24.0 
 
54. With the Motor Vehicle Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162, Congress created the 
first research and technical assistance program directed at motor vehicles. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 
42, at 401. 
55. In 1963, Congress created the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”), now 
called Department of Health and Human Services, to provide the states with scientific information on the 
effects of various air pollutants. In 1965, it authorized HEW to establish emission standards for new motor 
vehicles and engines based on “technological feasibility and economic costs” and ordered the designation 
of geographic air quality control regions. States had to adopt ambient air quality standards for each major 
pollutant subject to HEW approval and implement a plan, also subject to HEW approval, specifying 
emissions limitations for individual sources to meet the maximum levels of pollution necessary to maintain 
health and welfare that HEW had established for the region. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 401; 
A Common Thread of Service. A History of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (July 1, 1972), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/common-thread-service/history-
department-health-education-and-welfare [https://perma.cc/623K-METY].  
56. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45204, VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY AND GREENHOUSE GAS 
STANDARDS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2019).  
57. Id.  
58. Fuel economy—expressed in miles per gallon (mpg)—was defined as the average mileage 
traveled by a vehicle per gallon of gasoline or equivalent amount of other fuel. Id.  
59. Id.  
60. Id. 




mpg.61  The auto-industry bailout in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis 
provided “incentives” for the industry to accept ambitious changes to the CAFE 
standards envisioned by the Obama Administration.62  
With the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control and the Air Quality Acts, in 
the mid-1960s states began gaining considerable experience using technology-based 
standards, but progress to lower air pollution remained slow.63 Significantly, the 
regulated industries successfully lobbied administrators to delay compliance.64 
Congress, responsive to a growing number of stakeholders and regional interests, 
would continue to wrestle with these issues up to the present day.65 In 1990, it 
established new deadlines for compliance with the national ambient quality standards 
and prescribed means by which the states had to achieve compliance, including limits 
on vehicle use.66 However, both states and business interests managed to have some 
of the most environmentally progressive measures eliminated, like mandatory 
automobile inspections and employer vanpooling.67  
States have traditionally relied on technology-forcing standards rather than 
adopting traffic control measures when implementing National Ambient Quality 
Standards (“NAAQS”) for federally designated pollutants.68 “Technology-forcing” 
 
61. Id. See also infra Part II.C.  
62. See Robinson Meyer, How the Carmakers Trumped Themselves, THE ATLANTIC (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/how-the-carmakers-trumped-themselves/562400/ 
[https://perma.cc/53VU-S688].  
63. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 401, 402–403; David P. Currie, Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1970). 
64. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 404. Regulated entities included car manufacturers, 
concessionaries of coal-fired power plants, and other industries. Id. at 403.  
65. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 403; Reitze, supra note 52, at 1645.  
66. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 404; Reitze, supra note 52, at 1605. Measures like 
dispersing traffic, incentivizing people to use mass transit and not drive, requiring car inspections and 
maintenance programs, and setting standards for older vehicles, were often perceived by the driving public 
as too intrusive or restrictive. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the 
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENV’T L. 1647, 1686, 1693, 1702–03 (1991); see also EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 
101–02 (1977) (noting how states and cities balked at implementing secondary controls to achieve ambient 
air quality standards like “Transportation Control Plans,” which EPA ultimately withdrew rendering the 
case moot).   
67. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 404. Leanne Cusumano, Analysis of the 1990 Clean Air 
Act’s Employee Commute Options Program: A Trip Down the Right Road, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENV’T L. 175, 
208–09 (1993).  
68. Under the CAA, EPA sets National Ambient Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), i.e., maximum 
acceptable concentration levels for air pollutants that are deemed harmful to public health and the 
environment. 42 U.S.C. § 7409. The six conventional pollutants, known as “criteria pollutants,” are: 
Carbon Monoxide (CO); Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2); Ozone (O3); Lead (Pb); Particle Pollution (PM); 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2). GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 405. For an updated table of NAAQS, see 
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or “technology-based” standards—ones that require a particular type of technology—
are designed to correct a market problem and foster innovation.69  They are often 
based on a determination by Congress or a federal agency that a technology not yet 
commercially widespread is still technically feasible.70  By requiring car 
manufacturers to produce more efficient and less polluting cars rather than imposing 
behavioral changes on the driving public, state and local authorities have generally 
considered these measures more “politically acceptable” to bring improvements in 
personal transportation.71  
B. Regulating New Pollutants  
In the beginning, neither the CAA nor the EPCA were passed to regulate 
CO2 emissions to mitigate the effects of global warming. The stated goals of the 
CAA and EPCA were, respectively, to address sources of air pollution proven to 
endanger the public’s health and welfare and to reduce the consumption of oil and 
petroleum products including the use of gasoline to make the U.S. economy more 
resilient to oil shocks.72 By the late 1990s, however, it became clear that the global 
rise in temperatures compared to pre-industrial levels coincided with higher 
concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere and that such concentrations were the result 
of the burning of great quantities of fossil fuels to sustain human activities.73 At the 
time, CO2 derived from human activities (especially fossil-fuel driven 
transportation) was found to be the most important input to the warming problem.74 
Despite mounting scientific evidence, in 2003 the EPA declined a petition for 
 
NAAQS Table, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table [https://perma.cc/6LUF-
F6MG].  
69. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 56; Technology-Based Emission and Effluent Standards 
and the Achievement of Environemntal Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792, 800 (1982). 
70. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 56; David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Regulatory Reform, 32 BOSTON C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005). 
71. See supra text accompanying note 66.  
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7401; Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6201; CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 21.  
73. TRANSP. RSCH. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRANSPORTATION: SUMMARY OF KEY 
INFORMATION 1–2 (2012).  
74. Carbon Pollution from Transportation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-
and-climate-change/carbon-pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/A59K-5UPX].  




rulemaking brought by nineteen private organizations, asking the agency to use its 
authority under the CAA to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles.75  
The EPA put forward two lines of arguments to explain its refusal. First, it 
argued that the CAA did not authorize the EPA to promulgate mandatory 
regulations to address global climate change.76 Second, the EPA argued that even if 
it had the authority to regulate GHG emissions, it would have been unwise to do so 
because of scientific uncertainty.77 With respect to the first argument, the EPA relied 
heavily on the history of the CAA and on Congress’s more recent approach to dealing 
with man-made atmospheric pollution causing global warming: it reasoned that 
because the CAA was directed at local air pollutants and Congress in 1990 decided 
to “leave out” anthropogenic GHG emissions from the Act’s amendments, it 
followed that the CAA did not give authority to the EPA to regulate GHGs.78 With 
respect to the second argument, EPA noted that scientific uncertainty as to the 
existence of an “unequivocal” causal link between GHG emissions and the rise in 
temperatures justified the agency’s decision not to act.79 Further, the agency stated 
that regulating GHG emissions from motor vehicles alone represented a “piecemeal” 
approach not in line with the President’s desire to address the issue more 
comprehensively through technological innovation, voluntary programs, and further 
research on climate change.80  
Ultimately, the case resulting from EPA’s denial of the petition, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, which 
in 2007 ruled in favor of the petitioners, opening a regulatory path to tackle climate 
change under existing legislation.81 In fact, it was the Supreme Court in this case that 
first established that the EPA had authority to regulate GHGs under the CAA. The 
Court based its decision on the “capacious” and “unambiguous” language of the 
statute, which commands the agency to “by regulation prescribe . . . standards 
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator’s] judgment 
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
 
75. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007) (noting how plaintiffs sought petitions for 
rulemaking and collateral relief seeking the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles under Section 202 of the CAA).   
76. Id. at 511–12.  
77. Id. at 513.  
78. Id. at 508; see generally Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
79. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 508.  
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 534-35.  
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public health or welfare . . . .”82 The Act defines an air pollutant as “any air pollution 
agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance 
or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air . . . .”83 In the 
Court’s view, there is no doubt that “the definition embraces all airborne compounds 
of whatever stripe,” and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word 
“any.”84 “Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydro-fluorocarbons are 
without a doubt physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . 
the ambient air . . . .”85 In exercising its judgment, the EPA had to follow the 
statutory language, which is clear and unambiguous in granting the agency authority 
to regulate GHGs.86 In accordance with its decision, the Court ordered the EPA to 
make a determination as to whether such gases effectively endanger human health 
and welfare.87  
In 2009, the EPA conducted an extensive review of decades of scientific 
research and peer-reviewed assessment reports synthesizing thousands of individual 
climate science studies and concluded that the build-up of heat-trapping GHGs in 
the atmosphere does endanger public health and welfare.88 The 2009 rulemaking, 
referred to as  “Endangerment Finding,” also included the “Cause or Contribute” 
determination that GHG emissions from motor vehicles contribute to the dangerous 
atmospheric build-up of climate pollution.89 The two findings together provided the 
legal foundation for the EPA to issue GHG emissions standards for vehicles in 2010 
under Section 202 of the CAA.90 
 
82. Id. at 532 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). 
84. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529.   
85. Id. at 529 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
86. Id. at 532–33.  
87. Id. at 534–35. 
88. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (“NRDC”), 
EPA’S ENDANGERMENT FINDING: THE LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION FOR CLIMATE ACTION 
1 (2017), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/epa-endangerment-finding-fs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XK9Y-HDVF].  
89. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,496; NRDC, supra note 
88, at 2.  
90. NRDC, supra note 88, at 2.  




C. Current Standards  
For decades, EPA and NHTSA established performance standards for 
motor vehicles.91 These included primarily tailpipe emissions and fuel economy 
standards, under the respective authority of the CAA and EPCA, without any inter-
agency coordination.92 As a result, the standards were not particularly harmonized 
despite their practical interrelationship.93 Motor vehicle energy use and emissions 
are a function of miles traveled, the number of vehicles on the road, fuel efficiency, 
and the type of fuel.94 These factors combined determine the amount of pollution 
from each different category of motor vehicles (passenger vehicles, light trucks, 
heavy trucks, motorcycles, etc.). For example, a type of motor vehicle that uses less 
fuel per mile traveled will produce less pollution at the end of its useful life provided 
that the total miles traveled remain equal.95  
A possible curtailment of EPA’s authority was raised by NHTSA for the 
first time when the EPA began considering tailpipe emissions standards for a 
different kind of air pollutants—GHGs and, in particular, CO2—the amount and 
effects of which could be reduced by increasing motor vehicles efficiency.96 In its 
2007 decision, however, the Supreme Court clarified that EPA’s statutory obligation 
to protect the public’s health and welfare is “wholly independent of [Department of 
Transportation] DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency.”97 The Court 
reasoned that, while in practice reducing GHG emissions from motor vehicles may 
overlap with DOT’s authority to set mileage standards, such circumstance “in no way 
 
91. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 535–36; Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National 
Auto Policy: Lessons From the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 343, 346–50 (2011). 
92. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 535-36; Freeman, supra note 91, at 349–50.  
93. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 535-36; Freeman, supra note 91, at 353.  
94. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 534; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, ASSESSMENT OF FUEL 
ECONOMY TECHNOLOGIES FOR LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLES 12–15 (2011); EPA, GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS FROM A TYPICAL PASSENGER VEHICLE 2 (2018). 
95. It is often said that the energy savings from policies promoting more efficient vehicles are 
partially offset by the “rebound effect,” with people driving more miles as they spend less on fuel. DAVIES 
ET AL., supra note 18, at 498; Federal Vehicle Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., 
https://www.c2es.org/content/regulating-transportation-sector-carbon-emissions/ [https://perma.cc/9N 
DT-AMMA]. However, “according to the Department of Energy’s 2018 Transportation Energy Data 
Book, starting in 1978, passenger vehicle fuel use dropped from around 80 billion gallons of gasoline to 
just above 69 billion in 1982. Conversely, the number of registered vehicles increased from 116 million to 
123 million during the same time period. While the number of registered passenger vehicles increased, 
the number of miles driven per vehicle stayed relatively flat (around 9,000 miles per vehicle) throughout 
the time period." CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45493, THE WORLD OIL MARKET AND U.S. POLICY: 
BACKGROUND AND SELECT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 22 (2019).  
96. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 18, at 548. 
97. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 531–32 (2007). 
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licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities” and that “there is no reason 
to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid 
inconsistency.”98  
In light of the Supreme Court’s recommendations and the issuance of the 
Endangerment and Cause-or-Contribute Findings in December 2009, the Obama 
Administration took a new joint-rulemaking approach. First, the Administration 
brokered an agreement between major stakeholders in the automotive and truck 
industries, the states, and other interested parties to develop and implement vehicle 
GHG emission standards.99 Second, because CO2 from vehicle fuel combustion is a 
major source of GHG emissions, the White House directed EPA to work with 
NHTSA to align the GHG standards with the CAFE standards.100 EPCA and CAA 
generally preempt states from adopting their own fuel economy and emissions 
standards for new motor vehicles.101 However, under CAA Section 209(a), California 
enjoys the unique authority to issue motor vehicle emissions standards, provided that 
they are at least as stringent as federal standards and are necessary to meet 
“compelling and extraordinary conditions.”102 California had already promulgated 
GHG emissions standards prior to 2009, for which it had requested an EPA 
waiver.103 EPA granted California a waiver in June 2009, and President Obama 
directed EPA and NHTSA to harmonize the federal GHG and fuel efficiency 
standards with those developed by California.104  
On May 7, 2010, EPA and NHTSA finalized a groundbreaking joint 
rulemaking process, the Phase One standards, which affected model years (“MYs”) 
2012–2016 light-duty motor vehicles (passenger cars, SUVs, crossovers, minivans 
and most pick-ups).105 Under these regulations, emissions are designed to average 
250 grams/mile of CO2 combined with a fuel economy of 34.1 mpg in MY 2016.106 
 
98. Id. at 532.  
99. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 3; Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 49,454-01 (Sept. 28, 2009).  
100. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 3.  
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7543; 49 U.S.C. § 32919; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 1. 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B).   
103. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40506, CARS, TRUCKS, AIRCRAFT, AND EPA CLIMATE 
REGULATIONS 1 (2017).  
104. Id.  
105. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). The Obama Administration referred 
to the coordinated effort as the “National Program.” CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 1.  
106. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,330. 




According to EPA’s estimates, these standards would achieve a twenty-one percent 
reduction in fleet-wide emissions by 2030 compared to the level that would occur in 
the absence of the regulations.107 EPA and NHTSA promulgated the Phase Two 
CAFE and GHG emission standards for light-duty motor vehicle MYs 2017-2025 
on October 15, 2012.108 Under these new regulations, CO2 emissions would be 
reduced to about 160 grams per mile by 2025, with fleet-wide fuel economy rising to 
nearly fifty miles per gallon, and achieve a fleet-wide reduction of fifty percent of 
GHG emissions by 2025, much higher than the goal of the 2010 Phase One 
standards.109 
D. Reasons for Harmonization  
With the door now open to regulate GHGs from automobiles, the initially 
uncoordinated labor of EPA and NHTSA to set tailpipe emission limits for 
conventional pollutants and fuel economy standards did not seem appropriate 
anymore. The statutory goals of energy security and climate mitigation began to look 
less distant from each other, especially after the passage of the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (“EISA”), which emphasized the need to bring 
together energy and environmental policy.110 As stated in the joint EPA/NHTSA 
final rule of 2010, reducing both fuel consumption and CO2 were “twin problems” 
which could be addressed through one national program.111 The Obama 
Administration gave at least two reasons why CAFE and GHG standards required 
coordination and were aligned with the ones adopted in California. First, joint 
 
107. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 103, at 6.  
108. 2017 and Later Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624-01 (Oct. 15, 2012). As with the Phase 1 rulemaking, the 
Phase 2 standards were preceded by a multiparty agreement, brokered by the Obama Administration, 
including the State of California, thirteen auto manufacturers, and the United Auto Workers union. 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 6.   
109. 2017 and Later Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,627; see CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 7 tbl.1.  
110. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386. EISA, 
among other things, “required NHTSA to increase combined passenger car and light truck fuel economy 
standards to at least 35 mpg by 2020, up from a combined 26.6 mpg in 2007.” CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
supra note 56, at 2.  
111. “The National Program is both needed and possible because the relationship between 
improving fuel economy and reducing CO2 tailpipe emissions is a very direct and close one. The amount 
of those CO2 emissions is essentially constant per gallon combusted of a given type of fuel. Thus, the 
more fuel-efficient a vehicle is, the less fuel it burns to travel a given distance. The less fuel it burns, the 
less CO2 it emits in traveling that distance.” Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,327 (May 7, 2010) (citing 
PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, NAT’L ACADEMY PRESS, POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING: MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND THE SCIENCE BASE 
(1992)).   
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rulemaking between EPA and NHTSA would deliver “administrative efficiencies on 
a nationwide basis that would likely not be available under a less coordinated 
approach.”112 In this case, EPA and NHTSA developed common technical 
underpinnings, elements of program design, definitions of cars and truck, and 
flexibility mechanisms for compliance in supports of their standards.113 Having this 
level of harmonized rules favors uniformity and clarity to the industry’s advantage.  
Second, the EPA/NHTSA joint rule was a prime example of achieving 
“regulatory convergence by making it possible for the standards of two different 
Federal agencies and the standards of California and other states to act in a unified 
fashion.”114 As highlighted by the Administration, this “will allow automakers to meet 
both the NHTSA and EPA requirements with a single national fleet, greatly 
simplifying the industry’s technology, investment and compliance strategies.”115 In 
other words, harmonized federal and state standards would not only deliver multiple 
benefits to the public but also allow the industry to plan with reasonable certainty.  
The Trump Administration reopened the midterm evaluation process 
conducted under the prior Administration and concluded that the MY 2022-2025 
standards are “not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised” in a new 
rulemaking.116 On August 24, 2018, EPA and NHTSA proposed amendments to the 
existing CAFE and GHG emission standards.117 The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient 
(“SAFE”) Vehicles Rule for MY 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks offered 
eight alternatives.118 The agencies’ preferred alternative was to retain the existing 
standards through MY 2020 and then to freeze the standards at this level for both 
programs through MY 2026.119 The preferred alternative also removed CO2 
equivalent air conditioning, refrigerant leakage, nitrous oxide, and methane 
requirements after MY 2020.120  
After receiving public comments, on September 19, 2019, EPA and 
NHTSA released a final rule, the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (“SAFE”) Vehicles 
 
112. Id. at 25,326.  
113. Id. at 25,328.  
114. Id. at 25,326. 
115. Id. at 25,329.  
116. Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16077-01, 16078 (Apr. 13, 2018).   
117. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986-01 (Aug. 24, 2018).  
118. Id. at 42,990.  
119. Id. at 42,990; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 17.  
120. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 
84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019). 




Rule Part One: One National Program.121 In the final rule, NHTSA contends that 
EPCA preempts California’s standards because the statute preempts state laws 
related to federal fuel economy standards.122 In conjunction with NHTSA’s 
determination, EPA withdrew California’s CAA preemption waiver for its vehicle 
GHG standards applicable to MYs 2021-2025.123 On March 31, 2020, EPA and 
NHTSA released the second part of the rulemaking, the Safer Affordable Fuel–
Efficient (“SAFE”) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and 
Light Trucks.124 This final rule contains the revised GHG and CAFE standards, 
which increase in stringency only 1.5% each year through MY 2026 compared with 
the standards issued in 2012, which would have required about a 5% annual 
increase.125   
The question of preemption centrally implicates California’s authority 
under the CAA. The next section looks at the history of California’s air pollution 
control, first under its own laws then under the federal statute. It explains the reasons 
behind the state’s unique and longstanding role as a national “laboratory” for 
regulatory and technical experimentation. It then proceeds to analyze the more recent 
and unprecedented challenges to California’s authority and concludes with a critique 
of the reasons offered by the Administration for its revocation.   
III. CALIFORNIA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE MOTOR VEHICLE 
EMISSIONS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT  
A. History of California’s Air Pollution Regulation  
Before air pollution became a matter of federal legislation, municipalities, 
followed by the states, took the first steps to prevent the worst effects of black smoke 
and other emissions resulting from industrial development and urbanization.126 
Despite the increasing number of air pollution regulatory laws and ordinances passed 
in the late 1800s and early 1900s, localities lacked adequate organization, personnel, 
 
121. Id. at 51,362–363. 
122. Id.  
123. Id.  
124. The Safer Affordable Fuel–Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 25,278 (Apr. 30, 2020). 
125. Id. at 24,175; News Release, EPA, U.S. DOT and EPA Put Safety and American Family First 
with Final Rule on Fuel Economy Standards (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/us-dot-
and-epa-put-safety-and-american-families-first-final-rule-fuel-economy-standards 
[https://perma.cc/RW9N-JJL8]. 
126. Arthur Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR POLLUTION 
CONTROL ASS’N 44, 44–47 (1982).  
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and fiscal means to appropriately enforce them.127 The earliest state legislation 
regulating air pollution came out of Ohio in 1897, but the first state law to tackle air 
pollution other than black smoke was the California law of 1947, which authorized 
counties to regulate air pollution.128  
By the early 1940s, smog in the city of Los Angeles had become an issue of 
great concern.129 This prompted the city, and later the state, to act.130 The first 
recognized episodes of serious L.A. smog occurred in the summer of 1943.131 
Visibility was only three blocks. People suffered from burning eyes and lungs, and 
nausea.132 The phenomenon was termed a "gas attack" and blamed on a nearby 
butadiene plant.133 But when the plant was shut down, the smog did not abate.134 In 
1947, the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District—the first such body in 
the nation—was formed.135 The district regulated obvious culprits, like smoke-
belching power plants and oil refineries, but still the smog persisted.136 It was not 
until the early 1950s, when Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, a bioorganic chemistry professor 
on a one-year leave of absence from Caltech, figured out the nature and causes of 
photochemical smog, which made it clear that the automobile was the main culprit.137 
 
127. Id. at 44. In Stern’s opinion, the biggest progress in air pollution prevention was made with 
the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1963, when federal grants were made available to the states to fund 
research, training programs, and technical assistance. Id. at 47–48. Lack of opposition to powerful 
economic interests by local officials was another major cause of local failure to adequately regulate air 
pollution. The episode of Donora, in the state of Pennsylvania, mentioned in Stern’s article, well illustrates 
this trend. Id.; see also Lorraine Boissoneault, The Deadly Donora Smog of 1948 Spurred Environmental 
Protection—But Have We Forgotten the Lesson? SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.smith 
sonianmag.com/history/deadly-donora-smog-1948-spurred-environmental-protection-have-we-
forgotten-lesson-180970533/ [https://perma.cc/ST2F-KL3N].  
128. Ohio state law required “that every steam boiler in any city of the first grade of the first class 
(most likely meaning Cleveland and Cincinnati) shall be constructed or altered to prevent the production 
and emission of smoke so far as the same is possible and that these furnaces be so operated “on pain of 
fine by the operator.” Stern, supra note 126, at 47 (internal quotes omitted). The first state law to provide 
statewide authority to a state air pollution control agency was passed in Oregon in 1951; in 1957, California 
followed suit but only with respect to motor vehicles. Id. 
129. Id. at 48.  
130. Id.  
131. History, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (“CARB”), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history 
[https://perma.cc/ZPH8-ZBLS].   
132. Id. 
133. Id.  
134. Id.  
135. Id.  
136. Id.  
137. Id.  




Working in a specially equipped Los Angeles air district laboratory, he determined 
that two chief constituents of automobile exhaust—airborne hydrocarbons from 
gasoline, and oxides of nitrogen (“NOx”) produced by internal combustion engines—
were to blame for smog.138 His research, highlighting the reaction of sunlight with 
automobile exhaust and industrial air pollution, became the foundation upon which 
today’s air pollution regulations are based.139  
As a result of these scientific findings, California took action by forming a 
Bureau of Air Sanitation within the California Department of Public Health and 
requiring that the department establish air quality standards and set necessary 
controls on motor vehicle emissions of air pollutants.140 In 1966, California 
established the first tailpipe emissions standards in the nation.141 A year later, the 
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) was established.142 Three years later, the 
federal Clean Air Act, expanding on the 1967 Air Quality Act, recognized California’s 
earlier efforts, and authorized the state to set its own separate and stricter-than-
federal vehicle emissions regulations to address the extraordinary circumstances of 
population, climate, and topography that generated the worst air in the nation.143 
Under that authority, in 1971, CARB adopted the nation’s first NOx emissions 
standards for motor vehicles and led the way to the development of the catalytic 
converter, which would revolutionize the ability to reduce smog-forming emissions 
from cars.144  
Because of its more severe air pollution problems and its pioneering role in 
establishing motor vehicle emission control requirements in the 1960s, California has 
 
138. Id.  
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
141. Id. With the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act of 1960, the California Legislature created 
the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board (“MVPCB”) within the Department of Public Health which 
duties included establishing criteria for approving automotive pollution control devices, testing, and 
certifying the devices and making reports and recommendations to the Legislature, while the Bureau of 
Air Sanitation retained its duties but concentrated on stationary sources. MVPCB established the nation’s 
first vehicle emission control requirements for gaseous emissions. However, because it lacked the power 
to coordinate state and local activities to control air pollution, MVPCB recommended its own dissolution 
in favor of a more powerful agency. Thomas C. Austin et al., The California Vehicle Emission Control 
Program—Past, Present and Future, 90 SAE INT’L 3824, 3826–27 (1981).   
142. CARB, supra note 131. In 1967, the California Legislature combined the staff of the 
Department of Health’s Bureau Air Sanitation with the staff of the MVPCB and formed the California 
Air Resources Board (“CARB”). Its duties included dividing the state into air basins, monitoring air 
quality, adopting ambient air quality standards, promulgating motor vehicle emissions regulations, 
performing research, investigating special problems, assisting the local districts, and overseeing their 
activities. Austin et al., supra note 142, at 3827.  
143. CARB, supra note 131. 
144 . Id. 
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historically been allowed to adopt motor vehicle pollution control standards more 
stringent than the federal requirements.145 Moreover, in adopting purposeful 
technology-forcing regulations, EPA has generally followed the lead of California 
given its experience and leadership tackling air pollution.146  
B. California’s Waiver Under the Clean Air Act  
Title II of the CAA titled “Emission Standards for Moving Sources” 
generally preempts states from adopting their own emission standards for new motor 
vehicles or engines. CAA Section 209(a) declares:  
 
No State or political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to 
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. 
No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other 
approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to 
the initial sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor 
vehicle, motor engine or equipment.147  
 
As Congress observed in the legislative history of the CAA in 1970, the 
main objective of the federal preemption was to avoid “the multiplicity of state 
standards for emissions control systems on new motor vehicles.”148 On the one hand, 
Congress was cognizant that different states would face different conditions and 
would require the adoption of more stringent standards to comply with ambient 
quality standards within their region, and, on the other hand, that allowing each state 
to set its own emission standards for new vehicles would create the impractical and 
costly result that the automotive industry would have to comply with fifty different 
sets of rules.149 Federal preemption was therefore necessary and represented a 
compromise between achieving the greatest level of health and welfare protection 
while regulating motor vehicles emissions in a way that would be feasible and 
reasonable for automakers.150   
 
 
145. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 103, at 5.  
146. Id; see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1110–11 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).  
148. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 32 (1970). 
149. See id.  
150. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 494-95; see also Jeremy S. Scholtes, When the Darkness 
Consumes the Light, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENV’T L. 177, 204 (2008). 




Nevertheless, CAA Section 209(b) provides an exception to federal 
preemption of state vehicle emission standards:  
 
The [EPA] Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for 
public hearing, waive application of this section [the preemption 
of State emission standards] to any State which has adopted 
standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the 
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor 
vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines 
that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as 
protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal 
standards.151  
 
Only California qualifies for such a preemption waiver because it is the only 
state that adopted motor vehicle emission standards prior to March 30, 1966.152 In 
granting California the right to set different and more stringent standards, Congress 
sought to benefit not only the citizens of California but also the entire nation. It 
touted California as a “testing area” for innovative and ambitious air pollution control 
strategies that, if successful, could be rolled out on a national scale.153 Congress 
continued to explicitly recognize and endorse California’s leadership role in 
developing high-quality air emission standards, despite strenuous opposition of the 
automotive industry and warnings about a fragmented national market.154 Ten years 
later, with the 1977 Amendments to the CAA, it decided to substantially revise the 
waiver provision in an effort to further expand the deference accorded to California, 
and removed the original requirement that each California standard be more 
stringent than a comparable federal standard.155 Furthermore, Congress adopted a 
 
151 . 2 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). 
152. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 4. California adopted crankcase ventilation (PCV) 
requirements for cars in 1963 and exhaust emissions standards for domestically manufactured new 
passenger cars with MY 1966. Austin et al., supra note 141, at 3827.  
153. GRAB ET AL., supra note 49, at 1; see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 
1110–11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The history of congressional consideration of the California waiver provision, 
from its original enactment up through 1977, indicates that Congress intended the State to continue and 
expand its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor vehicle emission standards different from 
and in large measure more advanced than the corresponding federal program; in short, to act as a kind of 
laboratory for innovation. Had Congress wanted to limit California’s role to forbid its adoption of any 
program comparable to the federal scheme in section 207, it could have easily done so. It did not. For a 
court to do so despite the absence of such an indication would only frustrate the congressional intent.”)  
154. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 604 F.2d 685, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the 
EPA’s determination that methane is nonreactive and does not contribute to air pollution did not limit 
the agency’s authority to regulate methane). 
155. In 1977, Congress amended the condition that California had to meet to be granted the waiver 
from “more stringent standards” to standards that “in the aggregate” are as protective as the federal ones. 
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“piggy-pack” provision allowing other states to adopt California’s standards instead 
of national standards.156  
 
The CAA places three conditions on the grant of the waiver to 
California:  
 
No such waiver shall be granted if the [EPA] Administrator finds 
that:  
 
(A) the determination of the State [that its standards will be, in 
the aggregate, at least as protective of the public health and 
welfare as federal standards] is arbitrary and capricious;  
 
(B) such State does not need such [separate] State standards to 
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or  
 
(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement 
procedures are not consistent with [section 202(a)] section 
7521(a) of this title [which governs the promulgation and 
enforcement of federal vehicle emission standards].157  
 
Several factors support the idea that EPA has limited discretion in 
reviewing California waiver requests. First, as clearly stated by Congress when it 
passed the 1977 Amendments, it was Congress’ intention to limit EPA’s authority to 
deny a waiver: in a House Report regarding the waiver provision Congress affirmed 
that: 
  
In general, the Environmental Protection Agency has liberally 
construed the waiver provision so as to allow California to proceed 
with its own regulatory program . . . The Committee Amendment 
is intended to ratify and strengthen the California waiver 
provision and to affirm the underlying intent of that provision, 
i.e., to afford California the broadest possible discretion in 
selecting the best means to protect the health of its citizens and 
the public welfare.158  
 
 
An Act to amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)). 
156. Id. (codified as Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7507).  
157. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
158. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977). 




Congress’ objective was to prevent the EPA Administrator from 
“overturn[ing] California’s judgment lightly” or “substitut[ing] his judgment for that 
of the State,” and it restricted the grounds on which the EPA Administrator could 
refuse a waiver.159 Congress said that in order to find that California acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in determining that its standards were at least as protective as the 
federal standards, an EPA Administrator needed “clear and compelling evidence that 
the State acted unreasonably in evaluating the relative risks caused by various 
pollutants in light of the air quality, topography, photochemistry, and climate in that 
State.”160   
The resulting statutory language from the 1977 Amendments effectuates 
the congressional intent in two ways: first, it makes it easier for California to comply 
with the requisite that its standards be more stringent than federal standards by 
lowering their threshold. Under the new waiver provision, California only needs to 
demonstrate that its standards will be in the aggregate as protective as the federal 
standards.161 Second, it expressly vests California state officials with the authority to 
determine, in the first instance, whether California’s standards are sufficiently 
protective of public health and welfare.162 In fact, Congress shifted the determination 
regarding the protectiveness of the California standards from the EPA Administrator 
to the State, leaving the Administrator only with the power to review the State 
findings.163 This creates a strong presumption in favor of California’s determination, 
which can be overcome only by clear and compelling evidence to the contrary.164 
Another factor weighing in favor of California’s broad discretion in 
selecting its standards of protection is EPA’s own record. First, with respect to the 
third condition that California needs to meet to be granted the waiver, EPA has 
traditionally adopted a narrow interpretation:  
 
[T]he determination [as to whether California’s standards and 
enforcement procedures conflict with the promulgation and 
enforcement of the federal requirements] is limited to whether 
 
159. Id. at 302.  
160. Id.  
161. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). Under the original language of the CAA waiver provision in 1967, 
each standard had to be more stringent than the federal standards to obtain the waiver. Air Quality Act of 
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 501 (1967) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7543). 
162. Id.  
163. Id. Under the waiver provision of 1967, it was the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
who had to make the determination whether the applicant state (i.e., California) required more stringent 
standards than the federal standards to meet extraordinary and compelling conditions, and grant or deny 
the waiver. The Secretary’s duties with respect to air pollution control were subsequently transferred to 
the EPA Administrator, once the agency was created in 1970. GRAB ET AL., supra note 49, at 7–8.  
164. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 302 (1977).  
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those opposed to the waiver have met the burden of establishing 
that California’s standards are technologically unfeasible, or that 
California’s test procedures impose requirements inconsistent 
with the Federal Test procedure.165  
 
Courts have agreed with this narrow interpretation.166 Finally, EPA’s 
historical record in granting California waivers speaks for itself. Over the past fifty 
years, EPA has granted to California over fifty waivers and fully denied only one, a 
decision that was subsequently reversed by the agency.167  
C. Challenges to California’s Authority  
Since the adoption of federal legislation in 1967, California’s authority to 
set different standards to regulate air emissions from mobile sources was never 
fundamentally questioned.168 Past administrations have, at times, granted only partial 
waivers when they had found that some aspects of the waiver request did not meet 
the statutory criteria,169 but otherwise California has created its own rules and 
programs for traditional air pollutants linked to motor vehicle emissions under the 
CAA.170 At the core of EPA’s practice was the fact that there were “certain general 
circumstances unique to California” responsible for causing its air pollution 
problems—namely its local geography, wind patterns, and other climatic conditions, 
 
165. GRAB ET AL., supra note 49, at 2 n.21 (quoting Notice of Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption 
for California’s 2009 Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicle, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 
32,767 (July 8, 2009)). 
166 See, e.g., Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The 
‘technological feasibility’ component of section 202(a) obligates California to allow sufficient lead time to 
permit manufacturers to develop and apply the necessary technology . . . The federal certification 
component ensures that the Federal and California test procedures do not ‘impose inconsistent 
certification requirements’ . . . Neither the court nor the agency has ever interpreted compliance with 
section 202(a) to require more.”) (internal citations omitted)).  
167. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (“GAO”), GAO-09-249R, CLEAN AIR ACT: 
HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON EPA’S PROCESS FOR REVIEWING CALIFORNIA WAIVER REQUESTS 
AND MAKING WAIVER DETERMINATIONS 4 (2009).  
168. See id; see also Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, EPA, https://www.epa. 
gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations 
[https://perma.cc/EZ33-5MEN].  
169. GAO, supra note 167.  
170. See CARB, supra note 131 (“In the 1980s and ‘90s, CARB, which had already eliminated lead 
in gasoline, adopted standards for cleaner-burning gasoline, as well as initial standards for cleaner diesel 
fuel for trucks and buses.”).  




like thermal inversions—that, coupled with the presence and growth of its vehicle 
population, contributed to its serious air pollution problems.171  
The federal government’s hands-off approach began to change in 2005 
when California decided to request a waiver to regulate GHG emissions—a new and 
different kind of “air pollutant”—from automobiles.172 Initially, the Bush EPA 
decided not to act on the waiver request pending the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.173 After the Supreme Court’s ruling found that EPA had 
authority under the CAA to regulate GHGs, the agency commenced a hearing and 
public comment period on the waiver request.174 When EPA denied California a 
waiver for the first time in March 2008, it argued that the state didn’t need its GHG 
emissions standards to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions.”175 It pointed 
to two factors: first, the atmospheric concentration of GHGs is uniform across the 
globe; once emitted into the atmosphere, GHGs don’t stay localized or stationary as 
other air pollutants do; therefore, emissions of GHGs from motor vehicles in 
California do not affect California’s air in any different way than emissions of these 
same GHGs from other sources elsewhere.176 Second, EPA argued that the impacts 
of climate change resulting from these concentrations do not affect California in any 
particular and more detrimental way than other parts of the country.177 Thus, EPA 
found that the requirement for “compelling and extraordinary conditions” to justify 
 
171. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a 
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,160 (Mar. 6, 2008).  
172. See Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Exec. Officer, Cal. Air Res. Bd., to Stephen L. 
Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, (Dec. 21, 2005), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-
0173-0017 (on file with author). 
173. Letter from William L. Wehrum, Acting Assistant Adm’r, EPA, to Catherine Witherspoon, 
Exec. Officer, Cal. Air Res. Bd., (Feb. 21, 2007), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-
OAR-2006-0173-0002 (on file with author).  
174. California State Request for Waiver of Federal Preemption; Opportunity for Public Hearing, 
72 Fed. Reg. 21,260 (April 30, 2007); California State Request for Waiver of Federal Preemption; 
Opportunity for Public Hearing, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,626 (May 10, 2007); see generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
175. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,159–68; see also Letter 
from Stephen L. Johnson. Adm’r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, State of Cal., (Dec. 19, 
2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/20071219-slj.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T7WB-BF88].  
176. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,160–61. 
177. Id. at 12,162–68. 
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a preemption waiver was not met, and given the statutory relationship with the other 
two criteria, one finding was sufficient to deny the waiver.178  
A little after a year later, the Obama EPA reversed its position.179 It granted 
California a waiver to set its own GHG emissions standards for MY 2009-2016 on 
the basis that the prior Administration erred in reviewing California’s GHGs 
standards “in isolation” and “separately from” the remainder of its motor vehicle 
emission control program.180 Instead, it found that these standards were necessary to 
address the state’s overall pollution problems.181 The EPA Administrator reasoned 
that “[n]either the statutory language nor the legislative history of the CAA indicate 
that Congress intended to limit California’s broad discretion to a certain kind of 
pollution problem or to take away all discretion with respect to global air pollution 
problems.”182 Not only have the conditions that justify California’s need for a 
separate emission control program not changed, they will be exacerbated by climate 
change.183  
In its waiver request, California submitted scientific evidence showing how 
warming temperatures alone worsen summertime surface ozone pollution in polluted 
regions.184 This proved to be especially the case in urban areas and during pollution 
episodes (such as smog).185 Given California’s already high ozone levels, it was 
particularly vulnerable to climate change caused by GHGs.186 The Administrator 
noted that to obtain a waiver, California did not have to demonstrate that its program 
would achieve any substantial reduction in GHGs; rather, the existence of a “logical 
link” between the local pollution problems and California’s desire to reduce GHGs 
from motor vehicles was one way to address the impacts that climate change has on 
 
178. Id. Section 209(b) of the CAA uses the term “or” not “and.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). 
Therefore, the Administrator must deny a waiver if she finds that either one of the three conditions are 
not met.  
179. California challenged the Bush EPA waiver denial in the U.S. District Court of Appeals of 
the D.C. Circuit. See California v. EPA, Nos. 08-1178, 08-1179 and 08-1180 (D.C. Cir. Dismissed Sept. 
3, 2009)). However, EPA’s voluntarily reconsideration of its own decision under new leadership rendered 
the case moot. Id. 
180. Notice of Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicle, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,759–60 (July 8, 2009).  
181. Id. at 32,762–63.  
182. Id. at 32,761.  
183. Id. at 32,763. 
184. Id. at 32,763 n.112.  
185. Id.  
186. Id. at 32,765. In addition, California presented evidence of many other unique and arguably 
more severe vulnerabilities to climate change like wildfires, loss in snowpack, and coasts systems impacts. 
Id. 




its local air conditions.187 Provided that the program was not in conflict with federal 
standards and procedures, and was technically feasible, in the Administrator’s view, 
California was entitled to broad discretion as to what measures to put in place to 
achieve its legitimate policy goals.188  
In January 2013, EPA granted a second waiver to California for its 
Advanced Clean Cars (“ACC”) program for MY 2015-2025, observing that the 
different regulations making up the ACC were “complementary in the way they 
address interrelated ambient quality needs and climate change,” and were “necessary 
to achieve the coordinated goals.”189 Moreover, these standards were almost identical 
in stringency and structure as the federal light-duty vehicle emissions standards for 
MY 2015-2025 finalized by EPA in January 2013 and passed both state and federal 
mid-term reviews evaluating their feasibility.190 The ACC is a coordinated package 
of regulations that includes: emission standards for smog-causing pollutants; 
emission standards for GHGs; and a Zero Emission Vehicle (“ZEV”) program 
designed to commercialize battery-electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell technologies, 
reaching about fifteen percent of new vehicle sales in California by the 2025 time 
frame.191  
In response to the Trump Administration’s decision to re-open the 
standard-setting process, California initiated legal proceedings and later declared that 
it would only accept cars that meet Obama-era rules.192 The standoff between 
California and the Administration was “resolved” when EPA decided in September 
2019 to revoke California’s 2013 waiver.193 This withdrawal has no precedent in 
Administration practice since the passage of the CAA in 1967, and many scholars 
believe EPA has no statutory authority to revoke it.194 In its proposal, EPA has 
 
187. Id. at 32,763. 
188. Id. at 32,745.  
189. Notice of Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car Program 
and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2017 and 
Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112, 2131 (Jan. 9, 2013).  
190. Id.; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 5–6.  
191. Notice of Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car Program 
and Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emissions Vehicle Amendments for 2017 and 
Earlier Model Years; Notice, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2112–14, 2136. 
192. Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards / Greenhouse Gas Standards, HARV. ENV’T & 
ENERGY L. PROGRAM, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/corporate-average-fuel-economy-standards-
greenhouse-gas-standards/ [https://perma.cc/JQV9-R8LK]; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 
Summary.  
193. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 
84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019). 
194. See e.g., GRAB ET AL., supra note 49, at 4–5 (collecting cases). Some of the arguments that 
have been put forward to question the legality of the Trump EPA unprecedented action to withdraw a 
(granted) waiver are grounded in the plain language of the waiver provision as well as its legislative and 
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resuscitated the argument used by the Bush Administration back in 2008 to deny 
California its waiver: climate change caused by CO2 emissions is not a local air 
pollution problem.195 More specifically, the Administration argued that:  
 
Attempting to solve climate change, even in part, through the 
Section 209 waiver provision is fundamentally different from that 
section’s original purpose of addressing smog-related air quality 
problems. When California was merely trying to solve its air 
quality issues, there was a relatively straightforward technology 
solution to the problems, implementation of which did not affect 
how consumers lived and drove . . . Trying to reduce carbon 
emissions from motor vehicles in any significant way involves 
changes to the entire vehicle, not simply the addition of a single 
or a handful of control technologies. The greater the emissions 
reductions are sought, the greater the likelihood that the 
characteristics and capabilities of the vehicle currently sought by 
most American consumers will have to change significantly . . .  
Parts of California have real and significant local air pollution 
problems, but CO2 is not part of that local problem.196 
 
On September 2019, NHTSA and EPA released a joint final rulemaking in 
which the agencies made the following determinations: pursuant to the EPCA, only 
the federal government can set fuel economy standards, and state and local 
governments may not establish their own.197 State laws that substantially affect fuel 
economy standards also are preempted. These include tailpipe emissions standards 
and ZEV mandates.198 In addition, the 2013 waiver is withdrawn only to the effect 
that it allows GHGs standards (which are considered fuel economy standards) and 
ZEV mandates.199 California remains able to enforce its Low Emission Vehicle 
(“LEV”) program and other clean air standards to address harmful smog-forming 
 
regulatory history; others in relevant case law on statutory interpretation; and others on the conditions 
under which delegations of regulatory authority can be revoked under other provisions of the CAA and 
other federal statutory statutes. Id.  
195. See supra Part II.B.   
196. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986-01, 42,999 (Aug. 24, 2018). 
197. EPA, supra note 38. 
198. Id.  
199. Id.  




vehicle emissions.200 The rule became effective on November 26, 2019.201 As a result 
of the move, California sued NHTSA on September 20, 2019, in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia for its determination that California’s GHG 
standards and ZEV program are preempted by EPCA, leading a coalition of twenty-
three states, the District of Columbia, and two cities.202 On November 15, 2019, 
California filed a second lawsuit, this time against EPA for revocation of the 2013 
waiver under the CAA, leading a coalition of twenty-two states, two cities, and the 
District of Columbia.203 
D. EPA’s Rationale for Revocation of California’s Authority is not Persuasive  
EPA’s rationale for revoking California’s authority is not persuasive for at 
least three reasons: first, under the current statutory language and design, California 
must prove that its program “as a whole” is necessary to address its more severe air 
pollution problems, not that the pollutant(s) that California is trying to address need 
to be “local” in nature. Second, the Trump Administration has not offered any clear 
and compelling evidence to counter California’s showing that GHGs emissions have 
a degrading effect on its air quality (since the burden of proof lies with the opponents 
of the waiver, one can logically argue that the same burden applies in the case of a 
waiver that has already been granted by a prior Administration). Third, the 
Administration suggests that the type of vehicles that incorporate new technologies 
to comply with the California standards are not ones that Americans would like to 
drive, or would feel safe driving, but such statements do not find adequate factual 
support.  
Under the current language of the statute, California has to evaluate the 
relative risks of the various pollutants in the light of its air quality, topography, 
photochemistry, and climate, and come to a determination as to what standards 
would adequately protect the health and welfare of its citizens.204 In reaching its 
determination, California is afforded great discretion.205 As interpreted by the EPA 
in its decision to grant the 2013 waiver, EPA’s role is not and should not be to 
 
200. Id.  
201. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicle Rule Part One: One National Program, 
84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019).  
202. See Complaint, California v. Chao, No. 1:19-cv-02826-KB (D.D.C. filed Sept. 20, 2019).  
203. See Petition for Review, California v. Wheeler, No. 19-1239 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 15, 2019). 
Several regional California air districts and environmental groups file similar challenges against EPA in 
the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Petition for Review, S. Coast Air Quality Manage v. EPA, No. 19-1241 
(D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 15, 2019); Petition for Review, Union of Concerned Scientists v. NHTSA, No. 19-
1230 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 15, 2019).  
204. See discussion supra Part III.B.  
205. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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“second-guess California’s judgment” but instead is to limit its review of the State’s 
determination to the three criteria spelled in the statute.206 EPA’s job is, therefore, 
to evaluate whether California’s standards taken as a whole are logically and 
functionally linked to its regulatory objective, and are as protective as and not in 
conflict with federal standards.207 In its notice of proposed rulemaking, however, the 
Trump EPA’s main arguments for finding California’s determination arbitrary and 
capricious are that CO2 emissions are a global air pollution problem, not a local one, 
and that California should limit its regulations to address local smog-related air 
pollutants.208  
The first problem with the Trump Administration’s argument is that, in 
violation of the Congressional mandate, the Administration is not evaluating the 
ACC as a whole but only two of its components (GHGs and ZEVs standards).209 In 
other words, it is cherry picking already well-tested standards and conventional 
technologies that pose no fundamental risk to American auto manufacturers, nor 
challenge the primacy of oil and gas interests, while setting aside those that threaten 
the comfort of doing business as usual and represent—in the myopic view of the 
Administration—a dangerous, perhaps even unnecessary, leap towards an uncertain 
future. However, stripping away California’s authority to implement and enforce its 
ACC program also means taking away the right of California (and other thirteen 
states) to regulate those traditional air pollutants that the Administration eventually 
recognizes as a legitimate policy and regulatory objective through the adoption and 
dissemination of new and more advanced technologies. In fact, it is hard to see how 
a gradual substitution of conventional cars with vehicles that can reduce and even 
eliminate the need for gasoline fuel altogether, like electric ones—especially when 
accompanied by policies aimed at greening the electric grid—would not result in 
substantial reductions of all the waste gases that are produced by the combustion of 
gasoline in the first place.  
The second problem with the Administration’s reasoning is that it treats 
CO2 emissions as if they have no effect locally. While GHGs in general may have a 
global reach, this doesn’t mean that they cannot affect California’s climate in some 
unique way. In this respect, and in support of its request for a waiver, California has 
produced scientific evidence showing how GHGs and in particular CO2 are 
aggravating its air pollution by interacting with other motor vehicle pollutants in a 
 
206. Notice of a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car Program 
and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2017 and 
Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2115. 
207. Id. at 2126.  
208. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986-01, 42,999 (Aug. 24, 2018).  
209. Id.  




detrimental way.210 It is a well-established interpretation of the waiver provision—
and EPA’s longstanding practice—that the burden of proof rests on the opponents 
of the waiver to demonstrate that California should not be granted the right to set 
its own separate standards.211 This should be—logically—even truer in the case of a 
revocation of a waiver that has already been granted.212  
Yet, the Administration hasn’t shown any clear and compelling evidence 
that GHGs are not affecting the local climate in California, thus contributing to 
aggravate the state’s already very severe air pollution problems.213 The record shows 
quite the opposite: there is a solid body of scientific evidence suggesting that the 
interaction between “smog-causing” pollutants and warming temperatures will cause 
deterioration in local air quality.214 Mutually reinforcing negative effects create 
special challenges in California, where higher-than-average concentrations of ozone 
and particulate matter are known to generate “the worst air quality in the nation.”215 
Moreover, in response to the Administration’s argument that GHGs behave 
differently than local air pollutants, a study showed how before they reach and mix 
 
210. Notice of Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model 
Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicle, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,759–63. (July 
8, 2009).  
211. Id. at 32,749. 
212. In Section 209, Congress contemplated only two possible actions for EPA to either grant or 
deny a waiver but not to withdraw a waiver that has already been granted. Contrary to other permitting 
programs in the CAA, there is not substantive or procedural guidance for revoking a waiver. GRAB ET 
AL., supra note 49, at 6. Moreover, one stray reference in the legislative history of Section 209 cannot 
support a finding of revocation authority without it being firmly anchored in the statutory language. GRAB 
ET AL., supra note 49, at 7–9.  
213. See generally The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One 
National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019); see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1110 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 301-02 (1977)). Under the current 
statutory scheme, EPA must show that California’s determination is arbitrary and capricious. H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-294, at 302 (1977). However, nowhere in the proposed or new regulations EPA has demonstrated 
that climate change isn’t exacerbating California’s pollutions problems and, therefore, that California’s 
regulations as a whole are arbitrary and capricious to achieve its air quality goals.  
214. See Climate Science: Climate Basics: Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND 
ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/short-lived-climate-pollutants/ [https://perma.cc/36FA-
X7DL]; CARB, supra note 131; supra Section III.A. 
215. Ariel Wittenberg, Democrats Slam Wheeler for “Weaponizing” Agency, GREENWIRE (Oct. 8, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061224579/ [https://perma.cc/GG48-CEFM]; Jeff Brady, Trump 
Administration Escalates Battle Over Environmental Regulations With California, NPR (Sept. 24, 2019, 2:53 
PM) https://www.npr.org/2019/09/24/763876070/trump-administration-escalates-battle-over-
environmental-regulations-with-califo [https://perma.cc/ZG8T-5BVT] (noting how the Trump-era EPA 
acknowledges California’s grave air pollution issues and its unique situation). 
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in the upper atmosphere, local decreases in GHGs can have a direct effect in reducing 
ozone and particulate matter levels.216 
The third problem the Administration sees is a technological one. Rather 
than addressing California’s determination as required by the statute, and whether 
in the Administration’s reasoned opinion the ACC requirements are technologically 
feasible and achievable within the deadlines and not in conflict with federal 
standards, the Administration prefers to offer an odd (and unproven) series of 
observations regarding the evolution of historical advancements in motor vehicle 
emission control technologies. The Administration first affirms that in the inception 
of motor vehicle emissions regulation by California, there was a “relatively 
straightforward technology” to address its air quality problems that did not require 
changes in the way the public drove or in the kind of cars that consumers were 
buying.217 Moreover, the Administration advances the hypothesis that the type of 
vehicles that incorporate new technologies to comply with the California standards 
will significantly affect the way Americans live and drive,218 an argument that in its 
logic reminds some of the early arguments favoring the horse and buggy when 
confronted with early automobiles. 
The Administration argumentation is inaccurate at best and does not reflect 
the evolution and current transformations that are taking place in the automotive 
sector. First, the technology that California pioneered in the 1960s and 1970s was not 
straightforward at all: it was the result of discoveries and testing, like for the catalytic 
converter, cleaner fuels, and numerous other advancements which were later 
incorporated in all new motor vehicles models sold nationally.219 Moreover, that 
California has already conducted a comprehensive review of its 2012 Clean Cars 
program220 further demonstrates that developing these technologies is far from 
“straightforward,” for if it was, California would have by now resolved its air 
pollution problems. Today, new inventions are replacing the combustion engine at 
an increasing scale and pace, as in the case of plug-in hybrids, which have become 
very popular among consumers because—contrary to what the Administration 
asserts—they offer similar characteristics and driving performances compared to 
 
216. Notice of Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model 
Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicle, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,766, n.128.  
217. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. at 42,999.  
218. Id.  
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ACT 2 (2008).  
220. See Advanced Clean Cars Program, CARB, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/ 
advanced-clean-cars-program/about [https://perma.cc/6Z97-BX33].  




regular cars.221 They are conveniently refueled at regular gas stations and are driven 
in the same way.222 With respect to Zero Emissions Vehicles,223 which present 
greater challenges because of the need for special recharging stations, their growing 
popularity among the American public cannot be overstated.224 Congress enacted the 
CAA with the goal of designing a statutory framework based on technology-forcing 
regulations that would transform the automotive industry and bring about otherwise-
unlikely change and innovation.225 In doing so, Congress recognized and maintained 
California’s leadership role during the series of amendments to the CAA.226 The 
Administration’s statements ignore this history and openly conflict with the statute’s 
stated intent.  
Finally, revoking the 2013 waiver does not find unanimous support among 
car manufacturers themselves, who are the subjects of the technology-forcing 
provisions and who might be expected to oppose them, as they have historically 
done.227 But times have changed, and so have consumers’ choices and expectations—
especially among millennials.228 While three major companies—General Motors Co., 
Toyota Motor Corp. and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV—have sided with the 
Trump Administration in the legal fight over California's vehicle emissions standards 
by publicly supporting the Administration’s efforts to block California from setting 
 
221. See 3 Reasons Why Hybrid Cars are More Popular Than Ever, HYUNDAI (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.hyundai.news/eu/stories/3-reasons-why-hybrid-cars-are-more-popular-than-ever/ 
[https://perma.cc/BCT7-M4UN].  
222. Id.  
223. VIRGINIA MCCONNELL ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S EVOLVING ZERO EMISSION VEHICLE 
PROGRAM: PULLING NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO THE MARKET, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, Working 
Paper 19-22, at 1 (2019) (“A zero emission vehicle is a passenger car, light-duty truck, and medium-duty 
vehicle that produce zero exhaust emissions of any criteria pollutant under any and all possible operational 
modes and conditions. Only all electric and fuel cell vehicle meet this standard. Even though the 
production of electricity or hydrogen to power these vehicles may generate emissions, complementary 
state policies are designed to reduce power plant emissions.”).  
224. E.g., Musk Touts 146,000 Orders for Tesla’s Pickup Truck, ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/11/25/stories/1061639067 [https://perma.cc/ZE66-EXD6].  
225. David M. Driesen et al., Half a Century of Supreme Court Clean Air Act Interpretation: 
Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 1781 1792 (2018) (“Thus 
the CAA reflects a technology-forcing philosophy--a view that given sufficiently strict standards, polluters 
would figure out how to operate without damaging public health and accomplish feats that appeared 
infeasible.”). 
226. See supra Part III.B.   
227. Steven Cohen, The “Can't Do” Approach of the American Auto Industry, EARTH INST. (Mar. 27, 
2017), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2017/03/27/the-cant-do-approach-of-the-american-auto-industry/ 
[https://perma.cc/G23E-ZEXT]. 
228. Maxine Joselow, 5 Things to Know About the Split Between Automakers, CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 31, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/10/31/stories/1061419443 [https://perma.cc/JX57-
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vehicle emissions limits that are more stringent than those established by the federal 
government, four other automakers—Ford Motor Co., Honda Motor Co., 
Volkswagen AG and BMW of North America—are siding with California.229 Honda, 
in particular, voiced complaints about the Administration’s decision to open the door 
to “lengthy and costly litigation on this issue, which will result in a great deal of 
regulatory uncertainty,” something that Honda and other companies wanted to 
avoid.230  
Some automakers believe that their bottom line would be better served by 
improving cars than litigating in the courts. They feel confident enough in their 
ability to comply with California’s regulations.231 In fact, they have entered into a 
voluntary agreement with the State to implement tougher standards than those likely 
to be soon finalized by the Trump Administration.232 Their agreement also 
incorporates credits for building electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel vehicles 
as well as other incentives generally more favorable to automakers.233 In the 
automakers’ view, the value of the deal lies in a compromise designed to help them 
“meet both federal and state requirements with a single national fleet . . . to ensure 
meaningful GHG emissions reductions.”234 This is a view that is widely shared by a 
growing number of governors (some in purple states) as well as public electric 
utilities.235  
 
229. Id.  
230. Id. So much so that in July 2019, Honda, Ford Motor Company, Volkswagen of America, and 
BMW decided to enter into negotiations with the state of California and agree on standards stricter than 
those being sought by the White House, infuriating the President who demanded that the Department of 
Justice investigate the matter. Timothy Puko & Ben Foldy, Justice Department Launches Antitrust Probe Into 
Four Automaker, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-
launches-antitrust-probe-into-four-auto-makers-11567778958 [https://perma.cc/CMZ9-NMYN]. 
231. E.g., Maxine Joselow, Audi Exec Brushes off Trump’s Rollback, GREENWIRE (Dec. 4, 2019) 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2019/12/04/stories/1061723071 [https://perma.cc/VB9K-TU2E] 
(noting how Audi’s recent statements oppose the Trump Administration move to deregulate).  
232. But these standards are lower than envisioned under the Obama Administration. See David 
Shepardson & Ben Klayman, California, Four Automakers Defy Trump, Agree to Tighten Emission Rules, 
REUTERS (Jul. 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-emissions/four-automakers-
california-strike-compromise-on-vehicle-emissions-idUSKCN1UK1OD [https://perma.cc/VGK5-5JHY]. 
233. Id. The deal represents a compromise that has been criticized by some environmental groups 
like Safe Climate Campaign but, in the face of a potentially devastating rollback, also praised by others 
such as Sierra Club. Id.  
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2019) https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/12/05/stories/1061727197 [https://perma.cc/6Y36-
BKZT]; Maxine Joselow, Nev. Steers Tougher Tailpipe Emission Rules, E&E NEWS PM, (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2019/11/22/stories/1061619891 [https://perma.cc/46Z5-4538]. In July 
2019, twenty-four Alliance governors issued the Nation’s Clean Car Promise, reemphasizing their 
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IV. GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR MITIGATING EMISSIONS FROM 
TRANSPORTATION  
A. Governance Models 
The previous three sections have explored the federal statutory framework 
for the regulation of motor vehicle emissions in the United States, California’s 
unique authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions under the CAA, and the Trump 
Administration’s hostility towards a national program that aligns with California 
standards. As a result, what have emerged are two fundamentally different models of 
governance currently battling for acceptance in court.236  
One is the comprehensive yet flexible CAA approach, implemented under 
the Obama Administration, which supports California’s prominent role in leading 
innovation towards a future of zero emissions cars, while at the same time 
harmonizing as much as possible federal and states standards in order to facilitate 
automakers’ compliance.237 Under this approach, thirteen states have adopted 
California’s motor vehicle emissions standards under section 177 of the CAA.238 
Section 177 requires that their standards be identical to California’s. As a result, 
approximately thirty-five percent of domestic automotive sales comply with the 
California program.239  
As part of the agreement to grant the 2013 waiver, California consented to 
the federal government’s request that it treat vehicles complying with federal GHGs 
standards as meeting California standards.240 These standards are structurally 
different than the original CAFE program in that they substitute the grouping of 
passenger cars, imported passenger cars, and light trucks into three different 




236. See HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, supra note 192.  
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different size vehicles.241 The larger the vehicle footprint (in square feet) the lower 
the corresponding vehicle fuel economy target and the higher the CO2-equivalent 
emissions target.242 To comply with both CAFE and GHGs emissions, therefore, 
manufacturers can produce a wide range of vehicle sizes rather than just focusing on 
lightweight models in order to meet the targets.243 Moreover, car manufacturers have 
access to other flexible mechanisms such as buying credits from other companies to 
help them bring their vehicles into compliance.244  
The Trump Administration has adopted instead one uniform federal 
standard that decreases the fuel economy standards set under the Obama EPA and 
pushes de-carbonization goals for transportation backward.245 Among the reasons 
justifying this rollback, the Administration has alleged that moving forward with the 
prior targets would make cars more costly and less safe.246 Based on several 
considerations, such as changes in the focus of the overall analysis and modeling 
assumptions, observers have had difficulty comparing the costs and benefits reported 
under the proposed SAFE Vehicle rule.247 Some have argued that the modeling used 
by the Administration in its Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis is deficient.248 
Even using simple common sense, the rationale appears to be weak at best. Another 
major critique of the Trump Administration’s rulemaking is that revoking 
California’s CAA preemption waiver and substantially halting the rise in fuel 
economy standards can potentially lead to a bifurcation between federal and 
California standards if the courts support California.249  
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One of the advantages of the California waiver approach implemented 
under President Obama is that it harmonizes both CAFE and GHGs federal 
standards with those of California, effectively creating a predictable regulatory 
environment where automakers have to meet only one set of standards.250 Decreasing 
the stringency of federal standards while (potentially) leaving California standards 
in place would only generate regulatory incoherence without achieving any of the 
Trump Administration’s declared goals, namely having one national standard in 
place.251  
The Trump Administration’s actions set up questions of definition, 
priorities, and states’ rights, all with potentially far-reaching consequences. The next 
three sub-sections focus on the issue of federal preemption of California’s authority, 
introduce the Transportation and Climate Initiative as an additional example of 
state’s regulatory expertise, innovation, and leadership, and argue in favor of state 
autonomy more generally.   
B. Federal Preemption  
Governance schemes in the United States can hardly be divorced from 
federalism issues. Since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution with its Bill of Rights, 
the balancing between state and federal powers has proven a delicate and evolving 
jurisprudential exercise.252 The Tenth Amendment reminds the federal government: 
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.” 253 At 
the same time, the Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law takes precedence 
over state laws and even state constitutions.254 More specifically, preemption derives 
from the Supremacy Clause: preemption prohibits states from interfering with the 
federal government’s exercise of its constitutional powers and from assuming any 
functions that are exclusively entrusted to the federal government.255 The Supreme 
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Court has traditionally recognized three ways in which federal law preempts state 
law: explicitly, when a federal law contains a provision that withdraws certain 
authority from states; implicitly, where the federal scheme of regulation is so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
states to supplement it (“field preemption”); and finally, where compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose of the statute as 
a whole (“conflict preemption”).256 A federal agency acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority may preempt state regulation.257  
In this vein, the Trump Administration has launched a dual attack on the 
power of California and its followers to regulate motor vehicle emissions. On one 
hand, NHTSA is asserting that under the broad and clear EPCA preemption 
provision, states are forbidden to adopt laws or regulations “related to fuel economy 
standards or average fuel economy standards.”258 In NHTSA’s view, this includes 
California’s ACC program—specifically its GHGs standards and ZEVs mandates—
because these regulations are directly related to fuel economy.259 Moreover, contrary 
to the CAA, the EPCA contemplates no preemption waiver for California or any 
other state.260 Simultaneously, EPA has revoked California’s authority to regulate 
motor vehicle emissions under the CAA, as discussed above.261  
Two federal district courts have already examined the issue of motor vehicle 
GHG emission standards adopted by the states of California and Vermont, and both 
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found against preemption.262 The Supreme Court itself made clear in Massachusetts 
v. EPA that EPA and NHTSA implement different statutory mandates and that 
NHTSA and EPA (or California) standards can co-exist because they serve different 
purposes. In the Court’s words: “EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s 
‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ . . . a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s 
mandate to promote energy efficiency . . . The two obligations may overlap, but there 
is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and 
yet avoid inconsistency.”263 EPA and NHTSA had been carrying forward their 
regulatory responsibilities separately for decades, with one setting limits on harmful 
pollutants from automobile exhaust, the other establishing miles-per-gallon 
performance standards for different categories of vehicles. The Obama 
Administration, seizing a unique political moment, brought together EPA, 
California, and American auto-manufacturers (then on the brink of bankruptcy and 
in need of federal money) to establish the first GHG emission standards for 
automobiles and align those with progressively more stringent mileage standards set 
by NHTSA.264 The Obama Administration did not see why, while pursuing their 
autonomous statutory obligations, NHTSA and EPA couldn’t work together with 
California as co-regulators and in cooperation with the private sector towards 
achieving some overarching goals: making America more competitive by encouraging 
innovation and investment in advanced technologies and the creation of jobs; more 
resilient by reducing its energy consumption, improving on air quality and reducing 
the cost of driving for average consumers to benefit the health and wellbeing of all 
its citizens; and finally more relevant in the international arena by leading the charge 
against climate change.265  
At the very least, the revamped question of preemption of state laws or 
regulations under EPCA hinges on unconvincing arguments.266 First, NHTSA’s 
history of rulemaking and in particular its prior assertions that EPCA’s preemption 
operates only when a state issues a “regulation that relates to fuel economy and which 
 
262. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1179 (E.D. Cal. 2007), as 
corrected (Mar. 26, 2008); Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 303 (D. Vt. 2007).  
263. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).  
264. Meyer, supra note 62.  
265. Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Obama Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG 
Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012 
/08/28/obama-administration-finalizes-historic-545-MPG-fuel-efficiency-standard 
[https://perma.cc/X4HN-3ERE]. 
266. For a complete legal analysis of the question of preemption under the EPCA, see CAFE 
Standards and the California Preemption Plan, HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/cafe-standards-and-the-california-preemption-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/J75R-QNZG]. 
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addresses the same public policy concern as the CAFE statute”267 undercuts the 
Administration’s argument that NHTSA fuel economy standards preempt 
EPA/California GHG standards, precisely because fuel economy and GHG 
emissions standards do not address the same statutory concerns.268 Rather, they 
address different concerns that may in practice and to an extent overlap, as the 
Supreme Court explained, calling for enhanced agency cooperation and standards 
harmonization to the maximum extent possible, not the obliteration of one 
congressional statutory scheme (the CAA preemption waiver) on the basis of the 
other (EPCA’s preemption provision). Second, the “mathematical link” between 
GHG and fuel economy standards described by the Trump Administration in its 
regulatory proposal is insufficient to overturn a state law or regulation addressing 
GHG emissions through having “a connection with or reference to” the CAFE 
standards for preemption purposes.269 While reducing gasoline consumption by 
making conventional cars more fuel-efficient certainly contributes to reducing their 
air polluting emissions including CO2, there are a host of different means and 
technologies that can achieve the same result without having to use mileage 
standards.270  
To complicate matters even further, in May 2018, the Supreme Court 
revisited the longstanding division between preemption and commandeering 
doctrines in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.271 The issue in Murphy 
was whether New Jersey violated the federal Professional and Amateur Sport 
Protection Act (“PASPA”) by partially repealing the state’s prohibitions on sports 
gambling.272 PASPA made it unlawful for a state “to sponsor, operate, advertise, 
promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other 
 
267. See id. (citing to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Light Truck Average Fuel 
Economy Standards Model Years 2005-07, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,015, 77,025 (Dec. 16, 2002)).  
268. See id. 
269. Id. (describing how California GHG standard do have a connection with or reference to the 
CAFE standards).   
270. These different means and technologies include improving refrigerants and AC systems in 
conventional cars, switching to hybrids, hydrogen-cell, or EV vehicles, incentivizing public transit, 
walking, or biking, building high speed trains, etc. Contrary to what the Administration asserts there is 
not “one single pool of technologies” to reduce carbon emissions from motor vehicles. The Safer 
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light 
Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. at 43,234. 
271. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). Raether, supra note 44, at 1020, 1022–25 (illustrating the Court’s long 
held view that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from commanding affirmative 
action by state legislatures or executives).  
272. When Congress passed PASPA in 1992, few jurisdictions allowed some form of sports 
gambling, which were grandfathered into the statute, but New Jersey was not one of them. Murphy, 138 
S. Ct. at 1471–72.  




betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on competitive sporting events.273 
In parallel, it made it unlawful for “a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or 
promote” those same gambling schemes—but only if this was done pursuant to the 
law or compact of a governmental entity.274 The Court reasoned that in partially 
repealing its old laws banning sports gambling, New Jersey effectively “authorize[d]” 
such activity in violation of PASPA.275 Nevertheless, it found that the provisions in 
PASPA were an impermissible form of commandeering under the U.S. 
Constitution.276 In the novel reading of the Court, the basic principle—that Congress 
cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures to regulate the state’s citizens—applies 
not only when Congress actively compels state action (in the form of “to do orders” 
as traditionally interpreted by the Court) but also when it requires states to refrain 
from enacting certain laws (“not to do orders”).277  
The decision is relevant in the context of the California CAA preemption 
waiver because, as one commentator observed, the Court in Murphy failed to provide 
a straightforward answer on a matter at the core of the Tenth Amendment: how to 
effectively manage complex cooperative federalism regimes that bring federal and 
state governments together to control private conduct.278 The more expansive 
reading of the anti-commandeering doctrine in Murphy doesn’t protect California 
against the revocation of its preemption waiver.279 This is because preemption has 
consistently been recognized by the Supreme Court as an alternative way for 
Congress to regulate interstate activities while avoiding the anti-commandeering 
problem.280 As long as Congress validly preempts, states are stripped of their 
regulatory discretion.281 In Murphy, the Court left Congress’ broad preemption 
powers largely untouched.282 Therefore, to validly preempt, it is sufficient for 
Congress to act within its Constitutional authority and regulate private activities 
affecting interstate commerce.283   
 
273. Id. at 1470.  
274. Id.  
275. Id. at 1475.  
276. Id. at 1479.  
277. Id. at 1485.  
278. Raether, supra note 44, at 1049–51 (highlighting how the CAA provisions are directed, 
respectively, at vehicle manufacturers with the goal of addressing air pollution and states legislatures with 
the goal of avoiding a fifty-state approach to motor vehicle emissions regulation).  
279. Id. at 1032–1035. 
280. Id. at 1035–36. 
281. Id.  
282. Id.  
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress authority to regulate interstate commerce).  
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Even with a Supreme Court less sympathetic to the climate cause, the 
Trump Administration’s preemption argument will still face substantial 
interpretation challenges.284 While a federal command that states forbear from 
regulating certain activities would now be considered a prohibited form of 
commandeering, Murphy preemption analysis rests on whether a federal law is “best 
read” to apply to states or private actors; that is, whether a federal law “more directly” 
regulates states or private actors.285 If one were to apply Murphy to the issue of 
preemption under the EPCA, by prescribing federal mileage standards to 
automakers, NHTSA might escape its more expansive reading of the anti-
commandeering doctrine.286 However, in mixed regimes like the California CAA 
preemption waiver scheme, where Congress speaks both to states legislatures with 
the goal of avoiding a fifty-state approach to motor vehicle emissions regulation, and 
vehicle manufacturers with the goal of addressing air pollution, the outcome is less 
clear.287 A third possibility would be for the Supreme Court to recognize this limit 
in the Murphy pronouncement and offer jurisprudential answers that acknowledge 
the view that whenever possible, state sovereignty and political choice should be 
respected.288  
Where the regulatory framework stands now promises to force states to 
choose between two options: either the federal “one standard fits all” approach 
proposed by the Trump Administration;289 or the longstanding California approach, 
the latter of which the states will not be able to modify by scaling up or scaling down 
targets and timetables nor proposing different kind of tools and methodologies 
altogether, as in the past.290 This situation is not ideal, since a state may want to claim 
 
284. Raether, supra note 44, at 1046 (“Rather than providing clarity or guiding principles for the 
bounds of federal control of state policy, the Court swapped one formalist distinction in favor of another: 
from an action versus inaction division to a test hinging on whether the party most directly regulated is 
the state or private actors”).  
285. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).  
286. Even though the preemption provision of the statute explicitly mentions states, 42 U.S.C. § 
7543(a), this provision simply ensures that states do not tread on the broader regulatory scheme in the 
ECPA rather than commandeering states as key actors in the implementation of the ECPA. 
287. Raether, supra note 44, at 1046–49.  
288. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 42 at 1092–93; cf. Vikram David Amar, “Clarifying” Murphy’s 
Law: Did Something Go Wrong In Reconciling Commandeering and Conditional Preemption Doctrines?, 2018 
SUP. CT. REV. 299, 300 (2018) (“[I]t would be revolutionary to suggest Congress cannot cabin states' 
sovereign actions when states affirmatively regulate private actors—through new state-law restrictions or 
partial repeal of old ones—in a domain located within Congress's enumerated powers.”). 
289. Without the waiver, California and the other thirteen states that have opted in the California 
regulatory scheme won’t be able to impose nor enforce stricter motor vehicle emissions standards than 
those the Administration has currently finalized. See supra Part II.B.  
290. Before Congress preempted the field with the passage of the CAA in 1967, primary 
responsibility to regulate air pollution rested on the states. See supra Part II.A. 




some room to experiment, just like California. But, given the number of states that 
have chosen to follow California, one can view such result as a testament of the state’s 
competence in establishing itself as co-regulator with the federal government. This 
position was reinforced by CARB’s chief expert’s role in unveiling the Volkswagen 
emissions cheating scandal of 2015 that led to a record settlement between 
Volkswagen AG, five other auto companies owned by the Volkswagen group, EPA, 
and CARB, and one of the largest vehicle emission recall cases in U.S. history.291 
To date, the California waiver approach has represented the best 
compromise possible based on California’s historical but also well-deserved 
advantage as first mover. But nothing prevents one from imagining other, even more 
ambitious approaches, in which states are in competition with each other to lower 
emissions and proposals are integrated at a regional level to benefits from higher scale 
levels of decision-making and greater integration of local economies.292  
C. The Transportation and Climate Initiative 
Complementary to the CAA Preemption Waiver and Section 177, another 
emerging innovative approach for regulating emissions from transportation is the 
Transportation and Climate Initiative (“TCI”). Created in 2010, TCI is a regional 
collaboration of twelve Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States and the District of 
Columbia that seeks to improve transportation, develop the clean energy economy, 
and reduce carbon emissions from the transportation sector.293 There is only partial 
overlap between TCI and CAA Section 177 in that not all states that are part of TCI 
have adopted California’s motor vehicle emissions standards, and some Section 177 
states are not participating in TCI.294 Linking TCI states together is a Declaration 
 
291. See VW says its top U.S. executive is stepping down immediately, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 
9, 2016), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/vw-says-its-top-u-s-executive-is-stepping-down/art 
icle_2b1d94cc-27a2-5099-af25-3c1a4eecc266.amp.html [https://perma.cc/3NP4-AV6S]; see also Bill 
Chappell, ‘It Was Installed for This Purpose,’ VW’s U.S. CEO Tells Congress About Defeat Device, NPR, (Oct. 
8, 2015, 10:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/10/08/446861855/volkswagen-u-s-
ceo-faces-questions-on-capitol-hill [https://perma.cc/AF2V-AAVN].  
292. Cf. Conn. governor aims to work with neighbor states on climate, GREENWIRE (Dec. 12, 2019) 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2019/12/12/stories/1061792051 [https://perma.cc/SKE6-GFXD]; see 
generally infra Part IV.C.  
293. The participating states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. About Us, 
TRANSP. & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, https://www.transportationandclimate.org/content/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/BT6L-XCQB]. 
294. Two TCI participating states, Virginia and New Hampshire, are not Section 177 States. Three 
Section 177 States, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon, on the other hand are not part of TCI. States that 
Have Adopted California's Vehicle Standards under Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act, CARB (August 19, 
2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03/177-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE5V-K5S5]. 
The District of Columbia not qualifying as “State” presumably means it cannot apply to Section 177 of 
the CAA.  
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of Intent by which they have agreed to “launch a plan to explore and develop policies 
and programs that can result in greater efficiency of regional transportation systems 
and yield reductions of regional greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation 
sector.”295 Their efforts are facilitated and coordinated by Georgetown Climate 
Center staff and funded by various donors.296  
Among TCI’s main programs are the Cap-and-Invest program (“CAI”) and 
the Northeast Electric Vehicle Network (“NEVN”). The CAI program is essentially 
a cap-and-trade regulatory scheme modeled after the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (“RGGI”)297 through which the states agree to adopt a declining “cap” on 
carbon pollution from burning of fossil fuels in the transportation sector to reduce 
emissions from transportation.298 Under CAI, states would require large gasoline and 
diesel suppliers to hold allowances for the pollution that results from the combustion 
of these fuels that they sell to consumers.299 The proceeds resulting from the 
auctioning of allowances and trading of allowances among suppliers will be used to 
fund programs that increase and improve public transit, that make public transit 
cleaner and better, that encourage people to buy electric vehicles, bike or walk, and 
build electrification and other low-carbon transportation options with an eye on the 
needs of low-income communities, communities underserved by transportation, or 
disproportionately impacted by pollution.300 The NEVN, on the other hand, was 
launched in 2011 with a one million dollar Electric Vehicle readiness grant from the 
Department of Energy, and consists in TCI-participating states coordinating their 
electric vehicle infrastructure planning and deployment through the Northeast and 
mid-Atlantic region, which includes partnerships and connections necessary to 
transition to a cleaner and more efficient electric transportation network.301 At its 
 
295. THE TRANSP. & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, AN AGENDA FOR PROGRESS: DECLARATION OF 
INTENT 1 (2010), https://www.transportationandclimate.org/sites/default/files/TCI-declaration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YC6R-ULE6]. 
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297. THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/ [https://perma.cc/93Q5-
25BU]. 
298. Fact Sheet: Cap-and-Invest as a Tool to Reduce Pollution, TRANSP. & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, 
https://www.transportationandclimate.org/fact-sheet-cap-and-invest-tool-reduce-pollution 
[https://perma.cc/VLB5-AP4M]; see generally Georgetown Climate Ctr., TCI Video: Cap and Invest 101, 
VIMEO (Apr. 17, 2019, 4:40 PM EST), https://vimeo.com/331091117/331091117 [https://perma.cc/RT8
Y-PX47].  
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300. Id.  
301. The Northeast Electric Vehicle Network, TRANSP. & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, https://www.transp 
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see Electric Vehicle Supporters, TRANSP. & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, https://www.transportationandclimate.o
rg/content/electric-vehicle-supporters [https://perma.cc/Y4SV-AL6B].  




core, NEVN is designed to make sure that EV charging stations are built in locations 
that maximize both local and regional travel, that installation permits for home and 
public stations be streamlined, and barriers to the widespread use of EVs be 
removed.302  
The kind of regulatory regime a state (or group of states in coordination) 
chooses to adopt to reduce transportation GHG emissions will affect whether the 
CAA preempts it. As outlined in Part II of this Article, states cannot regulate tailpipe 
emissions from vehicles except through the California’s program. However, the CAI 
as currently proposed would be a regulation on fuel content, with the point of 
regulation being the gasoline and diesel fuel providers.303 Since it wouldn’t be a 
“standard” applied to vehicles or emissions at the point of combustion, it should not 
fall under the purview of the CAA preemption.304 With respect to NEVN, 
collaboration on EVs infrastructure doesn’t pose a preemption question because the 
program consists of a series of measures focused on facilitating the use of EVs and 
aimed at lowering emissions indirectly by putting more EVs on the road. Measures 
under NEVN are not the sort of “standard” or “regulation” that fit the language of 
the CAA.  
TCI shows how states can carefully design and implement policies that can 
deliver cleaner and better transportation systems without falling in the CAA 
“preemption trap.” The program is an additional regional laboratory and example of 
how state autonomy and experimentation can serve to lead the charge against climate 
change. At a time where constituencies are increasingly demanding action to address 
climate change,305 it is all the more important to make sure that states and local 
governments have enough regulatory space to innovate and meet the needs of their 
communities. As the TCI model demonstrates, state agencies have first-hand 
knowledge of their local realities and often are their communities’ best stewards, able 
to leverage critical resources to advance new ideas and attract venture capital.306  
 
302. TRANSP. & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, NEVN, supra note 301.  
303. Email from Kathryn Zyla, Program Director, Northeast Policy, Energy Foundation, to author 
(Dec. 13, 2019, 11:28 AM) (on file with author). See also DREW VEYSEY ET AL., GEORGETOWN CLIMATE 
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SYSTEMS CONSIDERATIONS 8–16 (2018).  
304. See generally Karen Glitman, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, CAP-AND-INVEST: A REVIEW 
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More on Climate, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 23, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/23/t
wo-thirds-of-americans-think-government-should-do-more-on-climate/ [https://perma.cc/3CW8-TDJ4]. 
306. See Derrick Hall et al., The Power of Local Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, https://nytimesineducation 
.com/spotlight/the-power-of-local-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/K983-BU75]; see generally Parris N. 
Glendening, We Need Better Transportation Options, Not More Roads and Lanes, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 
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D. The Case for State Autonomy  
On the one hand, environmental scholars argue that allowing for state 
autonomy and state “experimentalism” to address GHG emissions is a desirable 
regulatory framework and should be preserved because it drives policy and 
technology innovation “moving the ball forward.”307 On the other hand, some 
economists disagree, stressing that attempting to regulate GHGs emissions—a global 
problem—at the state or even regional level is costly and inefficient.308 They argue 
that local rules in particular are not suitable for dealing with diffuse problems like 
global climate change because they create market distortions and are ineffective.309 
However, in making those arguments, economists assume that even small progressive 
steps towards de-carbonization don’t matter. For example, they argue that CAFE 
rules are ineffective because automakers will sell fewer fuel-efficient cars in states 
that don’t adopt more stringent standards.310 But the argument fails to take into 
account the CO2 reductions that will be achieved by forcing manufactures to build 
an overall cleaner fleet for each model year. Although leakage problems may very 
well exist and higher emitting cars will be sold elsewhere, on average such emissions 
will still be less than without those CAFE rules in place.  
Moreover, the larger issue remains substantially the same as in the early 
1900s: will America incentivize the horse and buggy or the Model T—should it try 
to stop the next technological revolution in transportation or guide it? With the 
revocation of California’s CAA preemption waiver, the Trump Administration has 
signaled its intent to favor the first option. But this decision presents two profound 
ramifications: first, it means that by neither supporting nor incentivizing the 
transition towards alternative fuels and less polluting forms of transportation, 
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industry that is rapidly evolving.311 It is a well-known phenomenon that technological 
breakthroughs in an area can have spillover effects in other manufacturing or 
industrial applications. As a result, the economic consequences of America’s retreat 
could be far more reaching than just the automotive sector. Secondly, the country is 
bound to lose face with the rest of the world for not keeping its word and doing its 
part in reducing dangerous anthropogenic GHG emissions at a critical juncture for 
the stabilization of Earth’s climate.312  
Another argument put forward by economists is that local (state) 
regulations place a special burden on the auto industry and on consumers while 
achieving limited (or no results) in reducing global GHG emissions. They claim that 
the (eventual) benefits of such actions accrue globally but the costs are borne 
locally.313 It is safe to assume that, at least initially, demanding more efficient vehicles 
will drive their production costs and final prices up. By the same logic, it is also safe 
to assume that more efficient vehicles will deliver savings to consumers that—over 
time—offset higher upfront costs and could even bring the cost of driving down. And 
this is without calculating the non-transportation health and safety costs associated 
with air pollution and the lack of safer and cleaner mass transportation alternatives, 
especially with respect to inner city and intercity transport. Moreover, it is hard to 
see how under a regulatory scheme where federal and California standards are 
harmonized, the cost burden would fall exclusively on Californians. In general, the 
point of a regulation is not to be zero-cost but rather to produce the greatest 
achievable benefits at the lowest possible costs.314 An incremental reduction in CO2 
emissions from one country represent progress for all, something all countries have 
pledged to aim for under the Paris Climate Agreement with the goal of progressively 
decarbonizing their economies.315  
Most economists insist that the best solution to tackle the carbon problem 
is a national carbon tax (and ideally a global and uniform price on carbon) because 
such a measure applies across the board to all industries involved and can, therefore, 
achieve the greatest GHG reductions without producing market distortions.316 But 
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Tax?, in IMPLEMENTING A CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES 18–35 (Ian Parry et al. eds., 
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adoption remains politically challenging worldwide and especially in developing 
countries where economies are more fragile and less diversified.317 In the meantime, 
and in the absence of federal legislation passing a carbon tax or even an increase in 
the gasoline tax, which economists consider a superior tool to fuel efficiency 
standards,318 other less optimal but politically more viable alternatives will have to 
do. In this respect, state autonomy to experiment and innovate has proven crucial to 
fill the lack of national consensus on this issue.319 
This becomes apparent when looking at the potential consequences of the 
Trump Administration’s approach. According to a study by the Rhodium Group, the 
rollback of the fuel economy standards and the revocation California’s waiver will 
produce two significant results: first, ZEVs sales will decline by seven to eight 
percent in 2035 (depending on oil prices), which translates into about 12 to 14 million 
fewer ZEVs on the road by that year; second, from 2020 to 2035, emissions are 
projected to increase by 1,055 to 1,317 million metric tons cumulatively relative to 
Obama rules.320 Under a scenario where California and Section 177 states are instead 
allowed to maintain Obama GHG standards and keep their ZEV mandates in place, 
emissions rise by less than half as much over the same time frame.321 For comparison, 
total U.S. GHG emissions from transportation were roughly 1,900 million metric 
tons in 2018.322 Therefore, the California waiver plays a sizeable role in contributing 
to meet global temperature targets under the Paris Climate Agreement, unsurprising 
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given that it is the world’s fifth largest economy.323 Moreover, if the U.S. were to 
reach a plateau in ZEV sales now, the consequences would reach far into the future.324  
While fuel economy standards and ZEVs state programs combined might 
represent an imperfect solution to the carbon issue from the standpoint of pure 
economic theory, state leadership is nevertheless ensuring that the country is moving 
forward with research, development, and investment in low-carbon transportation 
solutions: an area where other industrialized countries, particularly China, are intent 
on moving forward.325 The kind of technological advancements that California is 
promoting are not just critical to meeting the challenges of climate change but also 
to ensuring the country’s technological vibrancy and relevance in an increasingly 
competitive global economy in which early market dominance matters. The risk of 
slowing down the pace of innovation for the U.S. is falling behind and losing ground 
in a global and highly competitive market.326  
More broadly, research increasingly finds that the electrification of 
transportation (together with buildings and factories) is an essential component of 
cutting GHG emissions and addressing climate change.327 For example, the 
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy estimates that electrification 
accounted for thirty-five percent of the emissions reductions that would come from 
halving U.S. energy use with energy efficiency measures, but transportation 
delivered the lion’s share of electrification’s emissions cuts, a whopping seventy-two 
percent.328 Therefore, the risk of delayed action also means setting back—rather than 
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building on—the progress made so far in decarbonizing the country’s electric grid 
and other important sectors of the U.S. economy.329  
E. Way Forward 
Although the Trump Administration did not make climate change a 
priority, the problem is not going away and future Administrations will have to 
confront it.  
Were national leadership more forward-looking, a regulatory regime 
capable of garnering broad national support could be one in which state initiatives 
are “nested” into the federal standards, following the approach proposed by the 
Obama EPA and NHTSA, where a group of states is allowed to move ahead while 
others remain bound by a federal “floor.”330 Alternatively, the federal government 
could take the lead and adopt a stronger set of standards than California that would 
apply across the board in all states, while letting states decide how they would make 
progress toward meeting the standards, depending on the current state of their 
transportation infrastructure, economic interests and options for compliance. A well-
defined “permit” system could also help advance acceptance of a national goal more 
organically achieved. Instead of imposing a set of ambitious standards too fast and at 
greater social and economic cost in some states, a flexible regulatory approach would 
allow the nation to make progress by having some more progressive states leading 
the technological transformation while bringing others to the same level in time. A 
national regime that is flexible enough to allow the states to reach the federal targets 
with different strategies and timeframes would allow gradual change without major 
shocks to local economies. 
A better way to assess complex regulatory schemes grounded on cooperative 
forms of federalism consists not in asking whether Congress can validly exercise its 
preemption powers but rather whether it should do so.331 When is preemption 
desirable? What is the best model to achieve a given outcome? Is the California 
preemption waiver a good model to foster innovation and competition while at the 
same time promoting public health and welfare?  
National consensus has long held that states are generally best positioned 
to tackle air pollution problems since these are the result of particularized local 
circumstances that vary from city to city, state to state, and region to region. 
Municipalities, counties, and states are all exposed to such problems daily and, 
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therefore, have the best knowledge and opportunity to identify air pollution issues. 
Special local circumstances are exemplified in the case of California, but apply to all 
states, and are explicitly recognized in the CAA. In fact, the statute gives primary 
responsibility to the states to formulate and implement state implementation plans 
to meet NAAQS.332 Letting the states chose which measures are the most adequate 
and effective to combat air pollution has been the main approach under the CAA for 
over fifty years.333 At the same time, especially with respect to mobile sources, the 
statutory design has represented a necessary compromise between the need to give 
the states enough flexibility to address their individualized pollution problems and 
provide the industry with enough regulatory uniformity both for manufacturing and 
compliance purposes.  
In a federation of fifty states, which is of continental size and has developed 
into at least five regional economies and eleven cultures,334 one must account for the 
fact that different states may have different needs, capacity, and political appetite to 
regulate in certain areas. This demands a sufficiently reasonable degree of flexibility 
when bringing change through regulation. With the CAA preemption waiver, 
Congress took an innovative approach grounded on federal-state cooperation 
cognizant of the fact that forcing technology using federal standards may not be 
practical, or even feasible, and could involve higher risks and costs: what if the 
regulated industry is not ready? What if the mandated standards are too ambitious 
or change is forced too fast? What are the redistributive social and economic 
consequences? Are these equally distributed?  
Letting one state experiment with a particular set of standards and 
technologies allows for promising solutions to be rolled out at the national level once 
they have been sufficiently tested, whereas a “one standard fits all” federal approach 
limits the discovery and adoption of more ambitious strategies by leveling out all 
fifty states. Far from a state or group of states imposing their policies on the rest of 
the nation, as the Trump Administration recently characterized it,335 the CAA 
preemption waiver scheme sets a democratic process in motion for growing 
innovation that is observant of states’ rights, needs, and differences. By establishing 
a federal floor while leaving some room for regulating differently, the federal 
government can “pilot and showcase” the benefits of a particular regulatory approach 
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while allowing states to decide whether to opt in or not. At the same time, it is 
containing the risks of moving too fast or taking too big steps at the national level.  
In a globalized and increasingly tertiary economy, traditional race-to-the-
bottom concerns arguing in favor of a uniform standards and federal decision-making 
in environmental regulation are mitigated by increased competition among states to 
build and invest in twenty-first century technologies to attract capital and high-
paying jobs. This is particularly true in the motor vehicle context, where automobile 
markets outside the U.S. look much more like California than the rest of the 
country,336 and this is confirmed by the fact that the Trump Administration’s 
attempts to rein in states’ regulatory powers are destined to have little, if any, 
practical effect in the longer term—at least judging by the voluntary cooperation 
between state and local authorities and the private sector, exemplified by the pact 
reached last summer between four automakers and California to adopt stricter 
standards than the ones finalized by the federal government337 or the Mid-Atlantic 
TCI initiative discussed above.338 Moreover, these attacks on state regulatory 
authority are unsound not only because they are shortsighted, but also because they 
contribute to further distance and isolate the federal government from the states and 
their constituencies at a moment when cooperation is essential at all levels of 
governance to deal with issues that countries alone can only inadequately address 
precisely because they are global in scope and require coordinated actions at the 
global level.  
V. CONCLUSION  
This Article concludes that air pollution and climate change are better 
addressed through a multilevel approach coordinated between federal and state 
authorities. California’s history with air pollution control and the revocation of its 
CAA preemption waiver both make clear the importance of state particularity and 
autonomy in drawing down GHG emissions. Such autonomy is even more crucial 
today, given the need for significant and steady transformations in the energy sector. 
This is particularly the case with mobile sources, the sources of most GHG emissions. 
Regulators had made little progress in this area until the Obama Administration 
decided to take a comprehensive approach and harmonize both fuel economy and 
greenhouse gas emissions standards. While such success may not be easily replicable 
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given the special circumstances that prompted cooperation between the automakers 
and the federal government, preventing California and other states from taking more 
ambitious steps without filling the leadership gap on climate won’t achieve any useful 
result for the auto industry, consumers, or America’s global technological leadership. 
 

